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ABSTRACT
SAMUEL ROSEN: Bank Capital Regulation and Systemic Risk in the Presence of Endogenous
Fire Sales.
(Under the direction of Mariano M. Croce)
In a model with heterogeneous banks and endogenous fire sales, the tightening of bank capital
regulation can aggravate fire sales, leading to larger bank losses and higher systemic risk. When
calibrated to the data, the least costly policies to mitigate systemic risk raise both ex ante capital
requirements and ex post shortfall penalties. These policies also assign relatively higher capital
requirements to banks that can better offset price declines during a fire sale, consistent with the
recently implemented capital surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). My
findings provide further support for leading-edge macroprudential tools, including stress tests and
countercyclical capital buffers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In my dissertation, I investigate the channels through which tighter bank capital regulation
affects the real costs of a financial crisis when fire sales are determined endogenously. The motiva-
tion for this topic is twofold. First, regulators responded to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 with
the “most significant reregulation of the banking industry since Glass-Steagall.”1 These reforms
are intended to reduce the severity of the next financial crisis, and many involve tighter regula-
tion of bank capital. Second, many papers document and argue that fire sales are an important
contributor to the severity of a financial crisis through their ability to propagate losses throughout
the financial system (Brunnermeier 2009; Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein 2011; Shleifer and Vishny
2011; Duarte and Eisenbach 2015). However, no paper to my knowledge has modeled the inter-
play between capital regulation and fire sales. The main contribution of this paper is to show the
significant impact of this connection for policy analysis.
In the first step of my analysis, I develop a three-period model with heterogeneous banks and a
regulator. Banks choose their asset portfolios anticipating a potential crisis. Conditional upon the
crisis state, banks may choose to sell assets. These selling decisions can cause market prices to
decline because of limited potential buyers, and I refer to this outcome as a fire sale. The severity of
the fire sale is endogenous because it depends on the volume sold. Banks are heterogeneous in their
ability to liquidate assets during a crisis, which affects both optimal portfolio and selling decisions.
As a result, the cross section of banks is a key input in determining equilibrium outcomes.
The regulator can influence bank behavior through two capital-based policy tools: ex ante
1A description of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a February 13,
2012, letter written by the Chief Investment Officer of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) to all regulatory agencies.
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capital requirements and an ex post penalty. The ex post penalty is increasing function of the
amount by which a bank violates its requirement, commonly known as its capital “shortfall.” The
regulator’s objective is to reduce systemic risk, which is a measure that indirectly captures the real
costs of a crisis. I define systemic risk according to the level of aggregate equity capital in the
banking sector during a crisis state.2 Through its capital-based tools, the regulator can ensure that
aggregate bank capital remains high during a crisis and therefore reduce systemic risk.
In the second step, I calibrate the model using data from regulatory filings and perform quan-
titative policy analysis. As part of this process, I also document novel stylized facts about banks’
selling behavior during the financial crisis. Using the calibrated model, I assess the effects from
tightening regulatory parameters and solve for the least costly policies to mitigate systemic risk.
The key mechanism behind my results is found in the optimal selling decision of a bank. When
a bank sells an asset in a fire sale, it incurs a realized loss. This loss occurs because the bank
is selling while the price declines, so it effectively sells at a weighted average price between the
asset’s initial and fire sale values. If a bank does not sell an asset that experiences a price decline,
it incurs an unrealized loss from marking down the value on its balance sheet (i.e., mark-to-market
accounting). There is a benefit to selling while the asset price is declining, because a realized loss is
necessarily smaller than an unrealized loss. A bank optimally decides to sell if this opportunity to
minimize the loss is large enough. Many factors affect the size of this benefit, including regulation
and the specific weighted average price at which the bank can sell.
My analysis delivers three main results. First, I show the existence of an endogenous fire
sale channel through which tighter capital regulation can unintentionally lead to higher systemic
risk. Undercapitalized banks sell securities to improve their capital ratio in order to reduce ex
post shortfall penalties. Tighter regulation effectively increases this benefit and therefore makes
the decision to sell more attractive, all else held equal. If more banks sell, the fire sale externality
sharpens, and system-wide losses increase. For this endogenous fire sale channel to materialize,
2Researchers have proposed many alternative definitions and measures for systemic risk, and currently there is no
consensus definition (cf. Allen and Carletti 2013; Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis 2012; Hansen 2012). The
measure I have chosen to use is based on a specific definition of systemic risk from the literature; I elaborate on the
underlying rationale for this measure in in section 2.3.
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the probability of a crisis must be sufficiently small so that banks do not hold a capital buffer to
avoid selling assets.
Second, in my quantitative analysis, I show that the least costly policies to mitigate systemic
risk raise both ex ante capital requirements and ex post shortfall penalties. This result highlights
that these regulatory tools provide systemic risk reduction with different cost-benefit tradeoffs.
Capital requirements are costly to banks because they are applied ex ante and force a bank to
hold additional capital in both noncrisis and crisis states of the world. Ex post penalties, on the
other hand, are generally less costly to banks because the penalty is only applied in the crisis
state (i.e., the penalty is state contingent). However, banks find it increasingly expensive to adjust
their portfolios in response to larger penalties. As a result, raising capital requirements eventually
becomes the less costly option for achieving further systemic risk reduction.
Third, these least costly risk-mitigation policies assign relatively higher capital requirements
to banks that can better offset price declines during a fire sale. This “capital surcharge,” which
is 6% to 8% depending on parameter assumptions, is the result of bank heterogeneity and the
regulator’s objective. I assume banks fundamentally differ in the effective price they receive when
selling during a fire sale, an assumption motivated by the data and empirical evidence from the
literature. Banks that can sell at a lower discount can generally be described as better able to offset
price declines. A simpler and more specific interpretation is that some banks can sell faster during
periods of rapid price decline. “Slow” banks incur larger realized losses when selling. As a result,
a higher ex post shortfall penalty is more costly to these banks. Therefore, in order to make up for
the disparity in costliness from increasing the ex post penalty, the regulator optimally raises capital
requirements only for “fast” banks. Intuitively, this capital surcharge compensates for the fact that,
through their selling behavior, “fast” banks impose losses on other banks by causing larger price
declines while incurring smaller realized losses themselves.
My findings have two broad implications for current and future regulatory policy. First, my
quantitative results are consistent with the recently implemented enhanced prudential standards
for institutions deemed “systemically important” and, in particular, the capital surcharge for the
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The G-SIBs correspond to the “fast” banks in my
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calibration, which are assigned higher capital requirements under the least costly policies. There-
fore, my results provide a fire-sale-based justification for the current regulatory regime. Second,
my findings provide further support for leading-edge macroprudential tools, including stress tests
and countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs). Their key potential advantage is to reduce systemic
risk without triggering the endogenous fire sale channel.
The model in this paper is closely related to the recent literature that seeks to measure systemic
risk generated through fire sales (sometimes denoted “indirect contagion”). Greenwood, Landier,
and Thesmar (2015) (henceforth GLT) describe a framework in which the effects from an initial
shock can be traced throughout the banking system in terms of selling that both generates and
amplifies losses. Cont and Schaanning (2017) modify the GLT framework to feature asymmetric
selling. They argue that fire sales arise only when one-sided portfolio constraints are breached
as a result of large portfolio losses, which implies an asymmetric reaction of banks to gains and
losses. These models, however, differ from mine along two relevant dimensions: they assume that
asset portfolios are exogenous and also that banks follow prespecified rules in making their selling
decisions. Building upon a similar fire sale framework, I endogenize both the ex ante portfolio
choice and distressed selling decision. After doing so, the connection between policy and systemic
risk becomes clear.
My paper is also related to the theoretical literature that analyzes endogenous fire sales in the
banking sector (e.g., Allen and Gale 2004; Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2011). As a particularly
relevant example, Diamond and Rajan (2011) develop a model in which fire sales in a future period
are exacerbated because of the risk-shifting incentives at troubled banks in the initial period. My
endogenous fire sale channel result is similar in that the private incentives and decisions of banks
lead to a negative externality via larger fire sale losses. However, my result differs in that selling
decisions do not rely on banks’ limited liability and risk shifting. Instead, the banks sell according
to a cost-benefit analysis influenced by regulatory parameters. Also, unlike Diamond and Rajan
(2011), my model features endogenous portfolio choice and ex ante capital regulation.
Although my paper is the first to jointly model capital regulation and fire sales, there is a grow-
ing literature that empirically investigates the connection. These studies face the dual challenge
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of both identifying regulation as the cause of selling and demonstrating a fire sale. Boyson, Hel-
wege, and Jindra (2014) do not find evidence that commercial banks sell affected assets at fire sale
prices during crisis periods. This lack of evidence, however, may be due to data limitations. Other
studies focus on the insurance sector for which the data quality is high and institutional details can
be exploited to make causal inference (Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad 2011; Merrill, Nadauld,
Sherlund, and Stulz 2014). These papers convincingly demonstrate that the violation of regulatory
constraints causes selling that can generate significant price distortions.
More broadly, the present study contributes to the literature on the role of bank capital reg-
ulation (see Thakor (2014) for a survey). The basic idea is that bank capital affects both risk
management and the ability to withstand economic shocks. However, forcing banks to hold more
regulatory capital may also create costs due to reductions in valuable maturity transformation, the
supply of deposits as safe liquid assets (Gorton and Pennacchi 1990), and/or monitoring from debt
holders (Diamond and Rajan 2001). The optimal capital structure will in theory trade off these ben-
efits and costs. My model, in which the losses from fire sales are a function of the cross section of
banks, provides a richer setting for policy analysis that seeks to determine sufficient levels of bank
capital to mitigate negative real externalities during a financial crisis (i.e., systemic risk). A full
welfare analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, given my reduced-form representation
of agents outside of the banking sector.
The policy analysis in this study contributes to the broader literature analyzing regulatory pol-
icy to address systemic risk (e.g., Allen and Gale 1998; Davila and Korinek 2017; Diamond and
Dybvig 1983; Farhi and Tirole 2012; Lorenzoni 2008; Stein 2012). My results are consistent with
those of Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017), who find that institutions should
be taxed according to the systemic risk they generate. The contribution of this study is to identify
a specific mechanism through which banks actually create systemic risk, thereby delivering an im-
plementation strategy based on available regulatory tools. Further, I specify the characteristic that
leads these banks to generate more risk in the first place: their greater ability to offset price impact.
Finally, this study is related to the literature that explores why profit-maximizing banks choose
to hold correlated downside risk. Farhi and Tirole (2012) develop a model in which expectations
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of central bank policy and strategic complementarities lead banks to optimally choose correlated
portfolios. Their model, however, does not offer a specific mechanism explaining how banks are
able to coordinate failure in the same states of the world. Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) motivate
asset commonality in a network model as a means to reduce the costs of debt, and Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2008) suggest that “herding” is a way to minimize the information spillover from
bad news about other banks. My model provides a distinct channel through which downside risk
materializes (i.e., the fire sale channel) that is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior.
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the model and
the main theoretical results. Chapter 3 presents the quantitative policy analysis. Chapter 4 relates
my findings and analysis to current regulatory policy. Finally, chapter 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
A MODEL OF THE CROSS SECTION OF BANKS
I consider a stylized model of the banking sector in order to highlight the interaction between
portfolio choice, capital regulation, fire sales, and systemic risk. After describing the setup, I char-
acterize the equilibrium and select optimality conditions. I then relate these results to equilibrium
systemic risk, focusing on the endogenous fire sale channel described in the introduction.
2.1 Setup
The model features three periods (t = 0, 1, 2) and an arbitrary number of banks (B). At t =
0, each bank chooses a portfolio from among three risky assets subject to a regulatory capital
constraint. At t = 1, there is a systematic asset shock and the banks may choose to sell assets.
These selling decisions can lead to market price declines, which create additional losses for banks
holding the affected assets. The equity capital of each bank is affected by the shock, the bank’s
own selling decisions, and losses due to market price declines. As a result, the bank’s capital ratio
may fall below the regulatory minimum. In such a case, the bank is considered “undercapitalized”
and, equivalently, it has a positive “capital shortfall.” At t = 2, the stochastic payoffs from the
risky assets are realized and the bank pays a penalty according to its level of capital shortfall at the
end of the previous period. This setup is summarized in a timeline in figure 2.1.
Three Risky Assets. Banks can choose from among three risky assets for their portfolios. These
assets broadly represent the types of risky financial assets that comprise the majority of bank bal-
ance sheets in the data.
1. Asset 1 is an illiquid two-period investment (e.g., bank loans) subject to a systematic shock
at t = 1, which is described further below.
2. Asset 2 is perfectly liquid marketable security (e.g., US Treasuries).
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Banks choose
portfolios subject
to a regulatory
constraint
t = 0
Realization of
systematic
asset 1 shock (ξ˜)
t = 1
Beginning
Banks sell assets,
asset 3 market
price declines,
capital shortfall
determined
t = 1
End
Banks receive
asset payoffs
less shortfall
penalties
t = 2
Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
3. Asset 3 is a marketable security with downside fire sale risk (e.g., asset-backed securities).
The downside fire sale risk refers to a potential market price decline at t = 1 that occurs due
to aggregate selling.
The asset payoffs at t = 2 are determined by a stochastic gross return vector R˜A ∼ (µ,Σ). The
elements of the mean return vector µ and covariance matrix Σ represent the fundamental (i.e.,
primitive) riskiness of the assets.
Bank Portfolio Problem. At t = 0, bank b is endowed with a fixed amount of equity capital(
Eb0
)
. Given a cost of debt (RD) and a regulatory framework
(
κbreg, φ, w
)
, the bank chooses a
vector of asset holdings
(
Ab0
)
, a capital buffer
(
βb
)
, and an amount of borrowing
(
Db0
)
to maximize
a mean-variance objective function. Formally, the bank solves the following problem:
max
A0,βb,Db0
E0
[
R˜bE
]
− γ
2
V ar0
[
R˜bE
]
(2.1)
subject to
Eb0
w′Ab0
= κbreg
(
1 + βb
)
(2.2)
Db0 = 1
′Ab0 − Eb0 (2.3)
as well as non-negativity constraints for the choice variables
{
Ab0, β
b, Db0
}
.
Mean-variance optimization is often used in the literature for the formulation for the portfolio
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problem of a financial institution choosing among multiple assets (e.g., Hart and Jaffee 1974; Kim
and Santomero 1988; Rochet 1992; Calomiris 2009; Glasserman and Kang 2014; Haddad and
Sraer 2015). These preferences capture, in reduced form, a bank’s concern for risk unrelated to
regulation. The mean-variance setup also has intuitive appeal because it is essentially the same as
imposing a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint on the bank’s portfolio. VaR is a common tool used in
practice both internally and by regulators for monitoring the riskiness of bank portfolios.
Equation (2.2) represents the regulatory capital requirement constraint. Given equity capital(
Eb0
)
, a bank’s portfolio and borrowing choices must result in a capital ratio that is greater than
or equal to the minimum level specified by the regulator (κbreg). This required level can be bank
specific. The vector w contains risk weights for each asset that are used to compute risk-weighted
assets (w′Ab0), the denominator in the bank’s capital ratio. In practice, risk weights are intended to
align a bank’s capital cushion to the riskiness of its assets, and the specific weight values are deter-
mined by the regulator. The constraint in (2.2) holds with equality because of the non-negativity
constraint for the bank’s capital buffer choice
(
βb
)
.
The level of borrowing in (2.3) is determined by the bank’s portfolio and buffer choices
(
Ab0 and β
b
)
.
The debt is to be repaid at t = 2 and the cost of debt (RD) is assumed constant. This modeling
choice has two implications. First, it assumes that debt is not priced according to asset risk, which
is a clear violation of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) conditions. Second, it implies that all bank
debt is long-term, which both is counterfactual and neglects the fundamental aspect of maturity
transformation in banking (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).
I justify the first implication by a combination of deposit insurance and collateralization, both
of which serve to make bank debt information insensitive. Although these elements are not ex-
plicitly included in the model, the literature has long acknowledged these features as common to
and necessary for bank debt.1 Moreover, banking theory often views bank debt as information
1The long-standing justification for deposit insurance is a means to prevent panic-based bank runs (Diamond and
Dybvig 1983). Repurchase agreements (“repo”) are another common form of non-deposit bank debt. Repos are
short-term and collateralized and therefore viewed as information insensitive during normal times (Krishnamurthy,
Nagel, and Orlov 2014). Repos, like uninsured deposits, are vulnerable to runs as observed during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 (Gorton and Metrick 2012).
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insensitive by design (Diamond 1984).
Despite its long-term appearance, the model still captures the costs associated with short-term
bank debt. The bank pays a penalty at t = 2 based on its financial distress during t = 1. In reduced
form, this cost represents in part the various costs that a distressed institution may pay when rolling
over short-term debt. This penalty and its interpretation are discussed in greater detail later in this
paper. To summarize, the modeling choice for debt is a simplification that allows me to more easily
focus the analysis on portfolio choice and fire sales but still captures key aspects of bank debt.
The stochastic return on the bank’s equity
(
R˜bE
)
is equal to the gross return on assets still held
at the end of t = 1 less the cost of remaining debt and penalty costs
R˜bEE
b
0 ≡ R˜′AA˜b1 −RDD˜b1 − Φ˜b (2.4)
The quantity values for assets and debt
(
A˜b1 and D˜
b
1
)
are stochastic because they depend on the
outcome of an asset shock at t = 1. The same is true for the penalty
(
Φ˜b
)
.
Bank Heterogeneity. The key heterogeneity across banks is their ability to offset price impact
during a fire sale. Specifically, the bank-specific parameter αb determines the price that bank b
receives if it sells during t = 1. As a result, banks can differ in their optimal selling decision
even while under the same regulatory framework. Additional consequences are that banks choose
different optimal portfolios at t = 0 and changes to regulatory parameters affect bank decisions
differently. I discuss the interpretation of this heterogeneity later in this chapter after describing
losses due to fire sales.
Banks may also differ in initial equity capital
(
Eb0
)
and minimum regulatory requirement (κbreg).
The former effectively determines the cross-sectional distribution of αb in the banking sector. The
latter is set by the regulator and therefore is not a fundamental characteristic. However, the re-
quirement level is a significant input into the bank’s optimal decisions.
Systematic Shock to Asset 1
(
ξ˜
)
. At the beginning of t = 1, there is a permanent shock to the
value of asset 1. This shock is perfectly correlated across banks and thus can be interpreted as a
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systematic crisis shock. The distribution of this shock is
ξ˜ =

0 with probability 1− q
ξ with probability q
(2.5)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1). The shock is in percentage units and therefore the value of asset 1
holdings for bank b at the end of t = 1 is
A˜b1,1 =
(
1− ξ˜
)
Ab0,1 (2.6)
Equivalently, the bank suffers a proportional loss
(
Ab0,1ξ
)
when the crisis state is realized
(
ξ˜ = ξ
)
.
Selling Assets (s). If the crisis state is realized at t = 1, the bank may want to sell its marketable
assets. The motivation for doing so is to reduce a penalty that is paid at t = 2. Each bank b chooses
to sell fractions sb2 ∈ [0, 1] and sb3 ∈ [0, 1] of its asset 2 and asset 3 holdings, respectively. As a
result, its holdings of the marketable assets become
Ab1,2 = (1− sb2)Ab0,2
Ab1,3 = (1− sb3)Ab0,3
Given a realization of the crisis state
(
ξ˜ = ξ
)
, each bank b optimally chooses
{
sb2, s
b
3
}
to solve
max
sb2∈[0,1],sb3∈[0,1]
E0
[
R˜bE | ξ˜ = ξ
]
− γ
2
V ar0
[
R˜bE | ξ˜ = ξ
]
(2.7)
For simplicity, I assume that the bank does not sell in the good state of the world.2
2Technically, a bank would optimally re-optimize its portfolio given the noncrisis state
(
ξ˜ = 0
)
. Given the illiquidity
of asset 1, this re-optimization would consist only of a reallocation from asset 2 to asset 3. Accounting for this term
in the solution, while easy to identify, would only serve to add notational clutter without providing meaningful
economic substance.
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Price Impact from Selling. The volume of selling of asset 3 has an impact on its market price.
I denote this price decline in percentage units as Ψ3 ∈ (0, 1). The level of the price decline is
determined according to a price impact function in which the only input argument is the aggregate
quantity of asset 3 sold:
Ψ3 ≡ Ψ
(
B∑
b=1
sb3A
b
0,3
)
(2.8)
This function satisfies the following general properties:
1. Bounded range: Ψ : R+ → [0, 1]
2. Positive price decline requires positive selling: Ψ (0) = 0
3. Monotonicity: Ψ′ (·) > 0
The form of this price impact follows from the theoretical literature on fire sales, which charac-
terizes fire sales as events in which many potential buyers of an asset are concurrently distressed
(Shleifer and Vishny 2011). As a result, any selling that takes place occurs at a price below the
fundamental value of the asset. The price impact function above represents in reduced form an
outside investor who provides liquidity to the banking sector during a fire sale. As long as this
investor has limited wealth and other investment options, the investor’s demand will be downward
sloping. Equivalently, the offered price is declining in the volume being sold. This exact type of
specification is similarly used in other fire sale frameworks (Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar
2015; Cont and Schaanning 2017).
Losses Due to Asset 3 Price Decline. Given selling decision sb3 ∈ [0, 1] and price decline Ψ3 ∈
(0, 1), bank b will incur two types of losses related to asset 3: unrealized and realized. The market
value of the remaining asset 3 holdings for bank b is
(1−Ψ3)
(
1− sb3
)
Ab0,3 (2.9)
This expression implies an unrealized loss equal to Ψ3
(
1− sb3
)
Ab0,3. In other words, bank b marks
down the value of these assets on its balance sheet and the corresponding losses are reflected in
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equity capital.3
For the share of asset 3 holdings it sells, bank b receives
(
1− αbΨ3
)
sb3A
b
0,3 (2.10)
This expression implies a realized loss equal to αbΨ3sb3A
b
0,3. In other words, the bank receives less
than the amount it paid for the holdings that it sells. Here we see the exact role that the bank-
specific parameter αb ∈ (0, 1) plays within the model framework. When selling, a bank receives a
weighted average price between the initial and fire sale levels with weights
(
1− αb, αb). If αb is
close to zero, bank b receives a high price. If αb is close to one, bank b receives a low price. This
price received directly affects the size of the realized loss. As long as αb < 1, the realized loss per
unit sold will always be less than the unrealized loss per unit of asset 3 held.
I follow Cont and Schaanning (2017) in incorporating realized losses and in the way that I
model them (i.e., the α parameter). The authors note that previous studies do not account for
the fact that banks liquidate assets at a discount to the current market price, which is known as
“implementation shortfall” in the literature on optimal trade execution (e.g., Almgren and Chriss
2000). Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2015), for example, assume that banks sell at the
current market price and then the market price declines according to a price impact function,
which would imply that αb = 0 for all banks. The inclusion of a realized loss, however, is critical
when the decision to sell is endogenous, as in my setup.
A novel feature of my model relative to that of Cont and Schaanning (2017) is that I also allow
3I assume mark-to-market accounting (also known as fair value accounting or FVA) in my setup because of its
empirical relevance. On average, 93% of security holdings in in my dataset are accounted for using fair value. There
is an open debate in the literature as to whether FVA should be used in the banking sector (Acharya and Ryan 2016;
Laux and Leuz 2010). The main argument against FVA is that it can force banks to sell of assets during a crisis
resulting in costly fire sales (Allen and Carletti 2008; Plantin, Sapra, and Shin 2008). Although fire sales in my
model are indeed driven heavily by FVA, an assessment on the optimality of FVA is beyond the scope of this paper.
My model does not account for the potential downsides of historical cost accounting (Bleck and Liu 2007; Ellul,
Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Wang 2015), which is the alternative accounting treatment. My model does capture,
however, an important purported benefit from FVA: banks internalize the probability of fire sales and choose safer ex
ante portfolios. In fact, this portfolio reallocation channel is a crucial aspect of the regulatory policies I analyze in
my quantitative analysis. Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Wang (2014) provide empirical evidence for this benefit
in the insurance sector.
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banks to be heterogeneous in the α parameter. This type of heterogeneity allows banks to make
different optimal selling decisions, all else held equal. I do not explicitly model the underlying
source of this heterogeneity, but there are two broad interpretations. First, some banks may funda-
mentally be able to trade faster, and therefore they receive higher volume-weighted average prices
when selling during periods of price decline. This higher speed may arise from a larger set of
established counterparties or from a larger trading operation within the firm (e.g., a larger number
of traders employed). Second, some banks may have superior information about the direction of
financial markets. Knowing that a large price decline is coming, these banks can begin trading
sooner and therefore will receive a higher volume-weighted average price. These interpretations
are not mutually exclusive, and clearly they imply the same end result. In the quantitative analysis
in chapter 3, I present empirical evidence that banks differ along this dimension.
Summing unrealized and realized, the total losses incurred by bank b due to the asset 3 price
decline is
Lb =
(
1− (1− αb) sb3)Ψ3Ab0,3 (2.11)
Capital Shortfall Penalty (Φ). A bank pays a penalty at t = 2 if its capital ratio is lower than
the required minimum at the end of t = 1. Specifically, this penalty is an increasing function of
the amount by which a bank’s equity capital is below its minimum, which is commonly known as
“capital shortfall.” Capital shortfall at the end of t = 1 (CS1) is defined implicitly
E1 + CS1
w′A1
= κreg (2.12)
where E1 and w′A1 are the equity capital and risk-weighted asset values, respectively, at the end
of t = 1 after all selling activity has concluded. Capital shortfall can be positive or negative. If
it is positive, the bank’s capital is below its minimum required level, and the bank is considered
“undercapitalized.”
The penalty that the bank pays at t = 2 is a linear function of its positive capital shortfall at the
end of t = 1:
Φ ≡ φ×max {CS1, 0} (2.13)
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At t = 0, this quantity is stochastic because it depends on the realization of the asset shock at
t = 1.
This penalty represents all of the costs that a bank’s equity holders should expect to incur if
its capital ratio falls too low. Broadly, these costs come from the regulator, debt holders, and the
issuing of equity. A clear distinction between the costs by source is not important as long as we
assume that the regulator effectively controls the penalty coefficient φ. In chapter 3, I conduct the
quantitative policy analysis under this assumption.
The regulatory aspect of this penalty is based on the prompt corrective action (PCA) framework
addressing financial deterioration in banks. This framework describes a sequence of increasingly
stringent interventions dependent primarily upon a bank’s capital ratios. These interventions range
from increased oversight to prohibiting capital distributions to closing and liquidating the bank.4
The goal of PCA is to rehabilitate a bank in order to avoid losses in the FDIC insurance fund, so
these measures are technically not to be viewed as a “penalty” in the punishment sense. However,
from the perspective of equity holders of a bank, PCA measures are effectively a punishment
for becoming distressed. Accordingly, PCA measures were utilized heavily during and after the
financial crisis of 2007–2009.5 Thus PCA resembles quite well the ex post penalty in the model.
The capital shortfall penalty also captures in reduced form the costs that arise from debt holders
in times of distress. Debt-related financial distress costs have been studied extensively in the
literature; these include fundamental-based bank runs (e.g., Allen and Gale 1998), difficulties in
rolling over short-term debt (e.g., Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer 2011), and overhang (Admati,
DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer ming). A common feature of these costs is that they are an
increasing function of a bank’s perceived distress level.
Finally, the capital shortfall penalty captures in reduced form the costs of issuing equity (Gomes
4For more details on PCA, see, e.g., the Government Accountability Office report “Bank Regulation: Modified
Prompt Corrective Action Framework Would Improve Effectiveness,” GAO-11-612, Jun 23, 2011.
5Between 2006 and 2010, 569 banks underwent the PCA process and 295 ultimately failed. PCA was implemented
prior to almost all bank failures. During this period, only 25 banks failed that did not first undergo the PCA process.
See Government Accountability Office, “Bank Regulation: Modified Prompt Corrective Action Framework Would
Improve Effectiveness,” GAO-11-612, June 23, 2011.
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2001). These costs can be viewed as voluntary if the bank chooses to issue equity during or after
the distress period. The costs can also be imposed through formal or informal pressure by the
regulator. As with debt-related costs, any equity-issuance costs would be increasing the level of
bank distress.
Parameter Assumptions. I make the following assumptions about the parameter space to either
simplify the analysis or focus on specific outcomes.
Assumption 1 The probability of a crisis (q) is sufficiently small such that no bank holds an excess
capital buffer in order to buy fire sale assets.
I describe the “small” condition for q in appendix A. The equilibrium implications from this as-
sumption are that banks will either sell asset 3 (s∗3 > 0) or not sell at all (s
∗
3 = 0) and the outside
investor represented by the price impact function is the only buyer. Other papers in the literature
use the expected profit from purchasing assets at fire sale prices as a primary driver in a bank’s
portfolio choice (Allen and Gale 2005; Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2011), but this type of
story is not the focus of this paper. Instead, by focusing on a crisis for which banks choose not
hold excess liquidity beforehand, my analysis is in the spirit of papers that model liquidity coming
from outside the banking sector (Allen and Gale 1998; Stein 2012).6
Assumption 2 The asset return covariance matrix (Σ) is diagonal.
This assumption greatly simplifies the analytical expressions yet leaves the economics of the prob-
lem unchanged.7
6Allen and Gale (1998) include a large number of wealthy, risk-neutral speculators who hold cash in order to
purchase assets when bank sell off assets cheaply to obtain liquidity. Stein (2012) defines a subset of “patient”
investors that both invest in new projects and absorb assets being sold in a crisis state.
7If the true covariance matrix of the asset returns S is not diagonal, we can perform a Cholesky decomposition (S is
positive definite because it is a covariance matrix) to find S = LΣL′ where L is a lower triangular matrix and Σ is
diagonal matrix. The bank problem can be rewritten so that the bank chooses a vector of exposure levels Aˆ0 to
orthogonal factors with returns summarized by (µ,Σ). To recover asset holdings, one can simply multiply the
exposure levels by the triangular matrix from the Cholesky decomposition (A0 = L′Aˆ0).
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Assumption 3 The fundamental expected asset return parameters satisfy
µ1 > µ3 > µ2 > RD
This assumption has a few implications. First, in a world with no capital regulation or systematic
shock, a bank would want to hold a positive amount of each asset. Second, it implies that asset 1
earns the highest risk premium and asset 2 earns the smallest risk premium, which is consistent with
the types of real-world assets they represent (bank loans and Treasuries). Third, it guarantees that
banks sell their holdings of asset 3 before selling those of asset 2, which simplifies the presentation
of the optimal selling decision by removing a few special cases (appendix B). This outcome was
also a stylized feature of the data at the height of the financial crisis as shown in chapter 3.
2.2 Equilibrium and Optimality Conditions
Before analyzing the optimal decisions, let us first define an equilibrium.
Definition 1 Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a vector of asset holdings
(
Ab0
)
, a capital buffer(
βb
)
, a level of debt
(
Db0
)
, and a set of distressed selling decisions
(
sb2, s
b
3
)
for each bank b as well
as a price decline for asset 3 (Ψ3) such that
1. Bank optimality:
{
Ab0, β
b, Db0
}
solves the t = 0 bank b problem in (2.1)–(2.3) and
(
sb2, s
b
3
)
solves the t = 1 bank b problem in (2.7) given
• Asset 3 price decline (Ψ3)
• Regulatory framework (κbreg, φ)
• The other model parameters
2. Market clearing: Asset 3 price decline (Ψ3) satisfies
Ψ3 = Ψ
(
B∑
b=1
sb3A
b
0,3
)
given the price impact function Ψ (·)
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Compared to a pure portfolio choice problem (i.e., q = 0), solving this model is significantly
more difficult. The asset 3 price decline (Ψ3) is taken as given by each bank at t = 0 but also must
be consistent with the portfolio choice and selling behavior of all banks at t = 1. However, we
gain richness in the model insights because the equilibrium asset 3 price decline (Ψ3) incorporates
the selling behavior of the entire cross section of banks.
The following proposition formalizes the key insight regarding the optimal bank selling deci-
sion:
Proposition 1 Optimal Asset 3 Selling. Ceteris paribus, bank b optimal selling for asset 3
(
sb3
)
is weakly increasing in
• The ex post penalty parameter (φ)
• The minimum capital requirement (κbreg)
• The fire sale price decline (Ψ3)
• The bank’s ability to offset price impact (−αb)
as long as αb <
(
1− κbregw3
)
.
Proof See appendix A.
From a policy perspective, there are two important implications from proposition 1. First,
tightening bank regulation can cause bank b to sell asset 3. This finding is the foundation of
the endogenous fire sale channel. Second, banks that can sell at a higher price (i.e., banks that
have a low α) choose to sell at lower threshold values than other banks, all else held equal. This
implication may seem obvious, but it highlights the reason that the cross section of banks is an
important input to both equilibrium outcomes and the choice of the best regulatory policies.
To better understand the optimal selling decision and proposition 1, it is helpful to consider a
numerical example. In figure 2.2, shows the policy function for selling asset 3
(
sb3
)
using specific
parameter values. Each panel represents the same policy as a function of a different input. The
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policy function is weakly increasing in each panel. The policy functions shown represent a par-
tial equilibrium outcome in which all other inputs (including the equilibrium price Ψ3) are held
constant.
The intuition for this outcome can be understood by comparing the extreme cases in which the
bank sells nothing or everything. If a bank does not sell asset 3 at all (s3 = 0), its payoff at t = 2
from asset 3 is a mean-variance payoff less the penalty from the unrealized loss due to Ψ3:
(µ3 −RD)A0,3 − 1
E0
γ
2
A20,3σ
2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean-variance payoff
−φ (1− κregw3) Ψ3A0,3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Penalty unrealized loss
On the other hand, if a bank sells its entire holding of asset 3 (s3 = 1), its payoff at t = 2 from
asset 3 is purely a realized loss due to Ψ3
−φ (αΨ3 − κregw3)A0,3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Penalty realized loss
Combining the expressions yields the net payoff at t = 2 from selling its entire holdings:
φ
(1−Ψ3)κregw3︸ ︷︷ ︸
From reducing assets
+ (1− α) Ψ3︸ ︷︷ ︸
From α < 1
A0,3
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit from reduced penalty
−
[
(µ3 −RD)A0,3 − 1
E0
γ
2
A20,3σ
2
3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lost mean-variance payoff
In this expression, we can see that the benefit term is increasing in all of the inputs listed in propo-
sition 1. This benefit comes from two sources. First, selling assets reduces capital shortfall by
reducing assets (the denominator of the capital ratio). As the minimum capital ratio increases
(κreg ↑), the reduction in assets has a larger effect in reducing capital shortfall because of the
lower leverage. Second, realized losses are smaller than unrealized losses for a given Ψ3 given that
α < 1. As the fire sale worsens (Ψ3 ↑), this benefit becomes larger. This benefit is also larger for
banks that can better offset price impact (i.e., that have a lower α). Finally, if the bank expects to
be penalized more severely (φ ↑), both sources of benefit are more valuable.
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Figure 2.2: Example Optimal Asset 3 Selling Function
The underlying parameters are from the calibration in chapter 3 (µ3 = 1.023, RD = 1.0045, w3 = 0.5, α = 0.67,
φ = 0.1454, κreg = 0.08, and Ψ3 = 0.1558). The dashed lines in each plot indicate the underlying parameter or
equilibrium values, which show that the bank in this example does not sell its asset 3 holdings.
Proposition 2 Capital Buffer. A bank holds zero additional capital buffer if the probability of a
crisis (q) is sufficiently small.8
Proof See appendix A.
Absent the ex post shortfall penalty costs, a bank only holds a capital buffer if the asset return
fundamentals are not sufficiently attractive for the capital requirement to bind. Including these
costs, the bank may want to hold an additional capital buffer to reduce the penalties or amount
of selling in the crisis state. Holding such a buffer is costly, however, because the bank gives up
profits in the noncrisis state. The larger the probability of the crisis state (q), the larger the expected
benefit from holding a capital buffer. This is the intuition that is formalized in proposition 2.
2.3 Systemic Risk
Following Acharya et al. (2017) and others, I define systemic risk (SRagg) using a measure of
aggregate capital shortfall. This measure captures the relative capitalization of the banking sector
8Whether or not this condition also holds given assumption 1 is difficult to show analytically. Therefore I simply
present it as its own condition on q, assuming that banks do not consider a strategy to buy fire sale assets at a
discount during the crisis, which is the implication from assumption 1.
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as a whole. The underlying idea is that aggregate undercapitalization creates negative externalities
in the real economy (e.g., reduced intermediation). Aggregate capital shortfall can be considered
a sufficient statistic for these costs that is relatively easy to compute in practice. As a result, it has
become popular as a measure for systemic risk.
Definition 2 Systemic Risk. Systemic risk is the non-negative amount of aggregate capital short-
fall relative to a fixed capital ratio level
SRagg ≡ max
{
B∑
b=1
SRb, 0
}
(2.14)
where each bank’s contribution is defined by
Eb1 + SR
b
w′Ab1
= ζ (2.15)
and ζ is the fixed capital ratio level.
Note that, compared to the definition of capital shortfall in (2.12), a bank’s systemic risk con-
tribution is measured relative to a fixed capital ratio level ζ instead of its regulatory minimum κbreg.
For reference, I set ζ = 0.08 in the calibration in the quantitative analysis (chapter 3), which is
the value used in the SRISK measure of Brownlees and Engle (2017). This aspect of measuring
systemic risk also follows from the literature and explains why increasing capital requirements can
lower systemic risk. Similar to capital shortfall, we can decompose the systemic risk contribution
from any given bank b into the following three components:
SRb ≈ ξAb0,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset 1 Loss
−
(
Eb0/(w
′Ab0)− ζ
Eb0/(w
′Ab0)
)
Eb0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Initial Capital Ratio Above SR Threshold
+L
(
sb2, s
b
3;A
b
0,Ψ3
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Fire Sale Loss
(2.16)
This decomposition will help us understand the impact from changing policies discussed in chapter
3.
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2.4 Endogenous Fire Sale Channel
Using the key results from the model and the definition of systemic risk, I now ready describe
the endogenous fire sale channel. This channel describes a sequence of endogenous effects, starting
with tightening regulation that leads to higher systemic risk. Specifically, tighter regulation can
lead to higher systemic risk through the following sequence:
{
κbreg, φ
} ↑=⇒ sb3 ↑=⇒ Ψ3 ↑=⇒ L (sb2, sb3;Ab0,Ψ3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Fire Sale Loss
↑=⇒ SRb ↑=⇒ SRagg ↑ (2.17)
In the first link, tighter regulation leads bank b to sell asset 3. This effect follows from proposition
1 and requires that bank b was not already selling the asset. In the next link, more selling leads
to a larger fire sale price decline, which is a direct result from the properties of the price impact
function in (2.8). In the third link, the larger fire sale price decline leads to larger fire sale losses.
This outcome, which is formally described in the following proposition, occurs as long as the
probability of a crisis (q) is sufficiently small.
Proposition 3 Fire Sale Losses Increasing in Asset 3 Price Decline. Ceteris paribus and assum-
ing a positive asset 3 holding
(
A∗0,3 > 0
)
, a worsening fire sale (Ψ3 ↑) creates larger bank b fire
sale losses if
min
{
µ3 −RD
2qφ
(
1− κbregw3
) , (1− q) (µ3 −RD) + κregw32qφ
2qφαb
}
> Ψ3
Proof See appendix A.
The intuition for proposition 3 is simple: bank b does not shift its ex ante holdings of asset 3
much if the probability of the crisis is low.9 The condition in the proposition guarantees that the
elasticity of a bank’s holding of asset 3 with respect to the fire sale price decline (Ψ3) is less than
one, which implies that total losses (price decline times holding) go up.
9The expression in proposition 3 can alternatively be characterized as holding for a sufficiently small ex post penalty
parameter (φ) value or for a sufficiently large expected return on asset 3 (µ3). These characterizations provide a
similar intuition as to why the bank’s fire sale losses in a crisis state increase despite a larger anticipated fire sale
price decline (Ψ3).
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In the final two links of (2.17), larger fire sale losses lead to larger systemic risk, as defined
above. To summarize, the tightening of bank regulation can lead to more selling, larger fire sale
price declines and losses, and higher systemic risk.
The sequence of effects in (2.17), however, does not describe all of the effects that occur in
equilibrium as the result of tighter capital regulation. There are several other endogenous effects
that occur concurrently, many of which mitigate increases in systemic risk. For example, an in-
crease in capital requirements also forces banks to hold a larger initial capital ratio level. In the
decomposition of systemic risk in (2.16), this effect directly reduces systemic risk.
The ultimate impact on equilibrium systemic risk from changing regulatory parameters de-
pends on the quantitative magnitudes from all effects describe above, and the direction is diffi-
cult to establish analytically. In the next chapter, I explore the equilibrium outcomes from policy
changes numerically in a calibrated model. I also characterize the least costly policies to mitigate
systemic risk that account for the impact of the endogenous fire sale channel.
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CHAPTER 3
QUANTITATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I investigate the quantitative impact from tightening capital regulation, given
parameter values that represent the US banking sector. First, I calibrate the model using asset
holdings data disclosed in regulatory filings. As part of this process, I document novel stylized
facts about asset selling by banks during the financial crisis. Using the calibrated model, I then
assess regulatory policies that mitigate systemic risk under different parameter assumptions and
potential regulatory objective functions.
3.1 Stylized Facts and Calibration
I calibrate the model to both the period before the financial crisis and the observed outcomes
during the financial crisis. The financial crisis offers a relevant empirical example for the model
developed in chapter 2. In particular, the fourth quarter of 2008 resembles the crisis state and
resulting fire sale. During this quarter, large and sharp price declines occurred across many types
of securities, as shown in figure 3.1. The left panel shows return indices for “risky” security types
that experienced steep declines from the beginning of the quarter, while the right panel shows
return indices for “safe” security types that experienced no price declines.
In aggregate, banks were net sellers of risky securities during this period (see table 3.1). Banks
sold 10.6% of their holdings in “risky” securities, while they increased their holdings of “safe”
securities by 7.6% (overall sales of 2.7% of their total securities holdings). A more detailed break-
down of the underlying asset types for the risky and safe subtotals is reported in table 3.1.
Figure 3.2 shows the share of asset-backed securities and private mortgage-backed securities
sold, by bank asset size groups. I focus on these two types of securities because of their notoriety
during the crisis (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 2009) and because they accounted for
a large volume of the selling that did occur (table 3.1). The top panels of figure 3.2 show that
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(a) Risky Securities (b) Safe Securities
Figure 3.1: Return Indices for Various Security Types 2008Q1-2009Q1
All indices are computed to have a value of 100 on September 30, 2008. The ABS index is computed from Bloomberg
Barclays US Agg ABS Total Return Value Unhedged USD, downloaded from Bloomberg (LUABTRUU Index). The
Municipal Bond index is computed from the S&P Municipal Bond Index. IG Corporate is computed from the FINRA
Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index. U.S. Treasury values are computed from ICE U.S. Treasury Core Bond
TR Index, downloaded from Bloomberg (IDCOTCTR Index). MBS (Govt) is computed from the net asset value of
the iShares MBS ETF, which tracks an index composed of investment-grade mortgage-backed pass-through securities
issued and/or guaranteed by U.S. government agencies.
the largest banks are the only significant net sellers of asset-backed and private mortgage-backed
securities.
The model suggests a few potential explanations for the cross-sectional difference in selling
behavior. These explanations include differences in (1) the ability to offset price impact
(
αb
)
, (2)
the level of distress
(
CSb1
)
, (3) capital requirements (κbreg), and (4) the ex post penalty parameter
(φ). Let us consider each of these alternative explanations.
According to market-based capitalization measures, the largest banks faced similar levels of
distress compared to the other size groups. In figure 3.2, I show the relative share of banks and
assets in distress by bank size group. The bottom panels support the conclusion that the largest
banks, as a group, were equivalently undercapitalized according to market-based capital ratios. I
use the market-based measures because they have two advantages relative to the accounting-based
regulatory measures: they are available within the quarter, and they capture changes to the market
value of all assets. In the model, banks have an incentive to sell assets at the beginning of a fire sale
if they expect to incur penalties as a result of being further undercapitalized. Figure 3.2 suggests
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Percentage of Percentage
Starting Sold during
Category Portfolio Quarter
Asset-Backed (Total) 12.0 41.4
Equities 10.0 0.0
MBS (Private) 9.4 6.8
Other Debt 19.4 6.3
US State and Muni 6.2 -2.1
Risky Subtotal 57.0 10.6
MBS (Govt.-backed) 32.1 -12.1
US Govt. Agency 6.2 -9.8
US Treasury 4.6 23.1
Safe Subtotal 43.0 -7.6
Total 100.0 2.7
Table 3.1: Aggregate Banking Sector Securities Portfolio in 2008Q4
Data are from FR Y-9C. Figures used to computed percentage of portfolio are fair value. The classifications into
“Risky” and “Safe” are subjective judgments based upon observed price declines during the quarter (see Figure 3.1).
Subtotals for percent sold are computed as weighted averages of the share sold for underlying types and cannot be .
Wells Fargo and Wachovia are excluded from the computations because of the data issues created by the merger
during the quarter. For data details see Appendix C.
that the largest banks did not have a particularly greater incentive to sell during the fourth quarter
of 2008.
The largest banks faced the same regulatory framework (κbreg and φ) as other banks leading up
to the crisis. Even if there were informal differences (e.g., in enforcement), these differences would
not account for the largest banks selling. According to proposition 1, the optimal selling decision
is an increasing function of a bank’s ex ante capital requirement (κbreg) and the ex post penalty
parameter (φ). Therefore, the largest banks would be the only group selling only if they had higher
values for either parameter. The precrisis evidence does not support this claim. In appendix D.3,
I show that the largest banks had lower capital ratios than most banks. Also, the popular narrative
that large banks were “too big to fail” (Sorkin 2010) implies that, if anything, the largest banks had
a lower value for the ex post penalty parameter (φ). To summarize, tighter capital regulation is not
a consistent explanation for the largest banks selling more of their assets.
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(a) Percentage of ABS Holdings Sold (b) Percentage of Private MBS Holdings Sold
(c) Percentage of Banks Under 6% Ratio (d) Percentage of Bank Assets Under 6% Ratio
Figure 3.2: Risky Security Selling and Market-Based Capital Ratios during 2008Q4 by BHC Asset
Size
Asset size is total assets in billions of dollars at the beginning of 2008Q4. Wells Fargo and Wachovia are excluded
when computing the figures for share sold because of the data issues created by their merger during the quarter. The
market-based capital ratio used in the bottom panels is computed as the minimum equity valuation during the quarter
divided by risk-weighted assets. The bottom left panel shows the number of banks with ratios below 6% divided by
the total number of banks within each asset-size group. The right panel shows the sum of the assets for banks with
ratios below 6% divided by the total sum of assets within each asset-size group. For data details, see appendix C.
There is a logical argument based on empirical evidence that may explain why the largest
banks can better offset price impact. These banks have significant broker-dealer subsidiaries and
tend to hold a large percentage of their securities as trading assets1, and these trading businesses
provide advantages during periods of market turmoil. In the context of the corporate bond market,
1The largest banks held 6% to 8% of their securities as trading assets between 2001–2006 compared to approximately
1% for all other banks. The largest banks also held 45% to 65% of their risky securities (as defined in table 3.1) as
trading assets between 2001–2006 compared to 10% to 20% for all other banks.
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Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song (2017) find empirically that being a central dealer was valuable
between September 2008 and July 2009 in two ways.2 These dealers charged higher prices to
both peripheral dealers and clients, and they also shrank significantly their holdings of bonds that
their clients were selling aggressively. The first finding directly supports a lower value for αb. The
second suggests that these dealers can and do act on private information about market activity from
order flow. This idea is also supported by Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2017), who
find evidence that brokers leak order flow information to their best clients in order to predate on
large liquidations by the other clients. In sum, the advantages from having large dealer subsidiaries
are consistent with better ability to offset price impact (i.e., lower αb).
Proposition 1 tells us that a bank that is better able to offset price impact (i.e., one with low αb)
can choose to sell while an otherwise identical bank with a higher αb does not. Therefore, if we
interpret the largest banks as having a low αb, we can find an equilibrium in which only the largest
banks are selling.
All together, the stylized facts in the data discussed above provide the following implications
for the benchmark model calibration:
1. Set B = 2 where bank 1 represents banks over $250 billion in assets as of the beginning of
2008Q4 and bank 2 represents all other banks.
2. The initial equilibrium under pre-2008 regulation must feature only bank 1 selling.
3. Bank 1 can better offset price impact (α1 < α2).
Table 3.2 shows the parameters that I can directly measure in the data. These parameters include,
for example, the return parameters for asset 2, which represents perfectly liquid assets that do not
incur any fire sale discount in the crisis state. Given my distinction between banks 1 and 2, I can
also easily measure the relative size of these banks during the sample period.
2Other over-the-counter markets follow a similar core-periphery structure. Li and Schurhoff (2014) show core dealers
trade faster in the municipal bond market. Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (ming) describe a similar network
structure in the securitization market.
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Asset-Specific Fundamentals Symbol Value Source
Mean Return, Asset 2 µ2 1.09% Ibbotson Associates
Volatility of Return, Asset 2 σ2 2.40% Ibbotson Associates
Probability of Asset 1 Shock q 4.00% Laeven and Valencia (2012)
Asset 1 Percentage Decline Given Shock ξ 4.98% FR Y-9C
Initial Equilibrium Asset 3 Price Decline Ψ3 15.58% FINRA
Cost of Debt RD − 1 0.45% FR Y-9C
Bank-Specific Fundamentals
Share of Aggregate Equity Capital
Bank 1 E1/(E1 + E2) 0.5 FR Y-9C
Bank 2 E2/(E1 + E2) 0.5 FR Y-9C
Regulatory
Minimum Capital Ratio
Bank 1 κ1reg 0.08 FR Y-9C
Bank 2 κ2reg 0.08 FR Y-9C
Table 3.2: Parameters Directly Measured in the Data
See appendix D for details.
I set the regulatory risk weights (w1, w2, w3) according to the following formula:
wi =
µi −RD
µ1 −RD (3.1)
so that the risk weight values do not distort portfolio outcomes (Kim and Santomero 1988; Glasser-
man and Kang 2014).3
There are several parameters that are either difficult or impossible to measure directly. I choose
these parameters in order to match the observed portfolio holdings and selling decisions (see table
3.3). For banks’ ability to offset price impact (α1 and α2), I solve the model over a range of input
values as a form of sensitivity analysis. Given the crucial nature of these parameters, it is important
to understand how equilibrium outcomes change with cross-sectional heterogeneity.
For the final element of the calibration, I follow Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2015)
and Duarte and Eisenbach (2015) in choosing a linear price impact function for the quantitative
3Other papers find similar results. Rochet (1992) proposes setting risk weights proportional to systematic risk.
Calomiris (2009) proposes tying capital requirements (effectively risk weights) to loan interest rates under the
assumption that higher rates imply higher risk.
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Panel A: Parameters
Asset-Specific Fundamentals Symbol Value
Mean Return
Asset 1 µ1 4.30%
Asset 3 µ3 2.30%
Volatility of Return
Asset 1 σ1 3.40%
Asset 3 σ3 5.50%
Bank-Specific Fundamentals
Risk Aversion γ 1.0
Ability to Offset Price Impact
Bank 1 α1 [0.20,0.39]
Bank 2 α2 [0.66,0.95]
Regulatory
Shortfall Penalty Coefficient φ 0.145
Panel B: Moments
Bank 1 Bank 2
Data Model Data Model
Ability to Offset Price Impact (αb) [0.20,0.39] [0.66,0.95]
Portfolio Shares
Asset 1 0.631 0.687 0.740 0.692
Asset 2 0.154 0.184 0.191 0.185
Asset 3 0.191 0.129 0.069 0.122
Distressed Capital Ratio 0.047 0.031 0.043 0.013
Table 3.3: Parameters Chosen to Match the Data
For α1 and α2, I consider a range of values such that α1 < α2. Data values for portfolio shares are average observed
holdings during 2002–2006. Model portfolio shares are averages over the
{
α1, α2
}
space, but the values do not change
much (at most by 0.002). Distressed capital ratios are computed using the minimum market-based capital ratio during
2008Q4. For data details, see appendix C. For calibration details, see appendix D.
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(3.2)
The max and min functions ensure that the range of the function is bounded between zero and one.
Otherwise, the basic linear function satisfies all of the price impact function properties described in
chapter 2. In the ensuing quantitative analysis, the equilibrium price decline is never equal to one.
The coefficient ψ3 is determined such that the benchmark calibration delivers an initial equilibrium
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price decline (Ψ3) equal to the value specified in table 3.2.4
In the bottom panel of table 3.3, I compare benchmark calibration model outcomes against
the data. I am able to qualitatively match the data values insofar as they differ across banks. For
example, the model results show that bank 1 holds a smaller percentage of its portfolio in asset 1
and experiences less market-based capital shortfall during the fire sale period.
3.2 Increasing Ex Post Penalties and Capital Requirements
Given a calibration, we can begin our steps toward policy analysis. In this section, I investigate
the effect of tightening each policy tool used in capital regulation, ex post shortfall penalties and ex
ante requirements, one at a time. The goal is to understand the impact from each type of policy tool
and how they may differ. These insights will be helpful in understanding the policies that combine
both.
Figure 3.3(a) shows the effects from relatively small increases in the ex post penalty parameter
(φ). Consistent with proposition 1, bank 2 joins the fire sale. As a result, there is a jump in the
asset 3 fire sale price decline, and both banks shift their portfolios away from asset 3. Since the
probabiliy of a crisis is only 4%, the portfolio rebalance is modest. Importantly, systemic risk
actually increases over this interval for the penalty parameter because the endogenous fire sale
channel described in section 2.4 dominates.
Figure 3.3(b) highlights the positive effects from increasing the ex post penalty parameter. Fur-
ther increases in this penalty parameter steadily lower the fire sale price decline, as both banks shift
their portfolios away from asset 3. Bank 2 shifts its holdings more dramatically because this bank
suffers larger realized losses during the fire sale episode given its lesser ability to offset the price
impact (high α). As a result, bank 2 is more affected by the increasing ex post penalty parameter.
Systemic risk also steadily declines following the initial increase. Based on this outcome, a regu-
lator with the goal of reducing systemic risk should either leave the ex post penalty unchanged or
increase it significantly to take advantage of its positive effect.
Before discussing increasing capital requirements
(
κbreg
)
, I must clarify an important aspect of
4The expression is ψ3 = Ψ3/
(∑B
b=1 s
∗b
3 A
∗b
0,3
)
, where s∗b3 and A
∗b
0,3 denote the optimal selling and asset holding
decisions given all of the other parameter values in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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(a) Small Increases in φ
(b) Large Increases in φ
Figure 3.3: Effect of Increasing the Ex Post Penalty Parameter (φ)
The underlying calibration uses parameter values from tables 3.2 and table 3.3 and the specific combination α1 = 0.33
and α2 = 0.67. Further calibration details are discussed in appendix D.
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this exercise. Technically, banks can meet a higher capital requirement in two ways: by raising
more equity capital (Eb0) or by reducing risk-weighted assets (w
′Ab0). In order to preserve the size
distribution of the banks and the size of the banking sector, I adjust equity capital (Eb0) in step with
capital requirements (κbreg). A benefit to this approach is that systemic risk does not mechanically
shrink, because banks become smaller with rising capital requirements. See appendix D.3 for
implementation details and recent empirical evidence.
In figure 3.4(a), I show the effect of increasing capital requirements for both banks
(
κ1reg, κ
2
reg
)
.
In the top left panel, we see that bank 2 switches to selling asset 3 after its capital requirement is
raised above 11%, which is an expected outcome based on proposition 1. As a result, the fire sale
price decline of asset 3 jumps up and both banks shift their portfolios away from asset 3. In the
bottom right panel, we see that, for each bank, contributions to systemic risk are monotonically
decreasing, except for the slight uptick to bank 1 when bank 2 switches to selling. Note, however,
that systemic risk still declines in aggregate, so the endogenous fire sale channel does not dominate
in this instance.
The key difference in the effects from increasing capital requirements versus increasing the
ex post penalty parameter can be explained through the decomposition of a bank’s contribution to
systemic risk in (2.16). Increasing the capital requirement effectively forces a bank to hold a larger
initial capital ratio level relative to the systemic risk threshold (ζ). Therefore the bank’s systemic
risk contribution mechanically declines, all else held equal. Systemic risk contributions can even
turn negative, which means that a bank’s distressed capital ratio level is above the systemic risk
threshold (ζ) at the end of the fire sale period. This benefical effect differs from the portfolio
reallocation caused by increasing the ex post penalty parameter (figure 3.3(b)), as the reallocation
effect lowers the net fire sale loss component of a bank’s systemic risk contribution.
If the regulator only increases the capital requirement for bank 1 (κ1reg), bank 2 does not switch
to selling asset 3. This result is shown in figure 3.4(b). This outcome should be expected, as propo-
sition 1 tells us that a bank’s optimal selling function is increasing in its own capital requirement,
not the requirements of other banks. As a related outcome, the bottom right panel shows that the
systemic risk contribution for bank 2 remains constant while the contribution of bank 1 declines.
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(a) Increasing Both κ1reg and κ
2
reg
(b) Increasing Only κ1reg
Figure 3.4: Effect of Increasing Capital Requirements (κ1reg and κ
2
reg)
The underlying calibration uses parameter values from tables 3.2 and table 3.3 and the specific combination α1 = 0.33
and α2 = 0.67. Further calibration details are discussed in appendix D.
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Systemic risk therefore declines at a slower pace. This result highlights a tradeoff to the regulator:
increasing capital requirements for bank 1 helps to avoid larger fire sale losses but will require a
larger increase to achieve similar levels of systemic risk reduction compared to raising both capital
requirements.
3.3 Policies To Mitigate Systemic Risk
In this section, I assess policies that mitigate systemic risk within the model framework. The
goal is to find an optimal set of policy parameter values for each given set of non-regulatory model
parameters. Aggregate capital shortfall, however, only relates to the real costs of a financial crisis.
Therefore, without a mapping from aggregate capital shortfall to the level of real costs, it is not
possible to precisely identify policies that maximize aggregate output or welfare. Thus, assessing
the optimality of the regulatory tools from a welfare perspective is beyond the scope of this paper.
As an alternative approach, I define optimal policies as those that mitigate systemic risk while
imposing the smallest cost on banks. Specifically, I solve for the policy parameters
{
κ1reg, κ
2
reg, φ
}
that maximize the average bank objective function value conditional upon zero systemic risk
(SRagg = 0). There are two reasons for specifying minimum cost as the regulator’s secondary
objective. First, one could view the value of a bank as a representation of the value it creates
through financial intermediation and services. Second, higher costs imposed on banks through reg-
ulation may lead to unintended real costs from banks trying to minimize their regulatory burden.5
Therefore, minimizing the cost of regulation is consistent with a welfare-maximizing regulatory
goals.
In the model, I define individual bank value as the objective function value as
V b ≡ max
Ab0,β,D
b
0
E0
[
R˜bE
]
− γ
2
V ar0
[
R˜bE
]
(3.3)
5Numerous papers have documented examples of how banks have worked around regulation to maximize profits (see,
e.g., Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2013; Duchin and Sosyura 2014; Houston, Lin, and Ma 2012). Acharya et al.
(2009) describe how banks “manufactured” tail risk prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Much of this behavior
was motivated by favorable regulatory treatment and corresponding increases in profit. As a direct result, the
financial crisis and corresponding recession were more severe than they would have been otherwise (Thakor 2015).
While some may argue that such actions were specific to the precrisis period, others such as Kane (1981; 2014)
argue that “loophole-mining” is actually a pervasive feature of the American financial system.
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Therefore the average bank value is
V Avg ≡ 1
2
(
V 1 + V 2
)
(3.4)
In table 3.4, I summarize the optimal policy and resulting equilibrium outcomes for the bench-
mark calibration.6 There are two key features of the optimal policy. First, it raises the capital
requirement of only bank 1 (κ1reg) from 8.0% to 15.2% and leaves the capital requirement of bank
2 (κ2reg) unchanged at 8.0%. In other words, the optimal policy implies a “capital surcharge” for
bank 1 relative to bank 2 (κ1reg minus κ
2
reg) equal to 7.2%. Second, it increases the ex post penalty
parameter significantly, from 0.145 to 1.368. In sum, the optimal poicy is a capital surcharge for
bank 1 and a higher ex post penalty parameter.
Both regulatory tools are tightened as part of the optimal policy because they provide systemic
risk reduction with different cost-benefit tradeoffs. Capital requirements are costly to banks be-
cause they are applied ex ante. A bank is forced to hold additional capital in both noncrisis and
crisis states of the world, which reduces the bank’s return on equity because it is less levered. Ex
post penalties, on the other hand, are generally less costly to banks because the penalty is only
applied in the crisis state (i.e., the penalty is state contingent). To understand why, note that banks
optimally respond to a higher ex post penalty parameter by shifting their ex ante portfolios away
from assets that generate capital shortfall. As the penalty parameter increases, banks further shift
their ex ante portfolios and the corresponding cost to the bank of this distortion grows. In other
words, banks find it increasingly expensive to shift their portfolios further away from the portfolio
that would be optimal without the threat of ex post penalties. Intuitively, a bank only chooses to
shift its portfolio further given a higher expected ex post penalty. Because the marginal return to
increases in the ex post penalty parameter is decreasing, there is a level of the penalty parameter at
6For explanatory purposes, I use the same cross-sectional distribution for the bank-specific speed parameters{
α1, α2
}
as used in figures 3.3 and 3.4. Later in this section, I show how the optimal policy parameter values vary
with the cross section. Although the specific values change, the optimal policy remains qualitatively similar in all
cases.
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Restricted Only
Optimal Optimal
Symbol Initial Optimal κ1reg = κ
2
reg Penalty
Policy Parameters
Capital Requirement
Bank 1 κ1reg 0.080 0.152 0.109 0.080
Bank 2 κ2reg 0.080 0.080 0.109 0.080
Ex Post Penalty Coeff. φ 0.145 1.368 2.240 1.368
Equilibrium Outcomes
Systemic Risk
Aggregate SRagg 0.653 0.000 0.000 0.476
Bank 1 SR1 0.260 -0.242 0.001 0.228
Bank 2 SR2 0.393 0.242 -0.001 0.248
Objective Function
Average V avg 1.376 1.280 1.268 1.350
Bank 1 V 1 1.376 1.212 1.270 1.352
Bank 2 V 2 1.376 1.347 1.265 1.347
Asset 3 Port. Fraction
Bank 1 A10,3/1
′A10 0.128 0.127 0.120 0.110
Bank 2 A20,3/1
′A20 0.123 0.027 0.001 0.044
Bank 2 Selling Asset 3 No Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.4: Optimal Policy to Mitigate Systemic Risk
The bottom section of the table shows select equilibrium outcomes using the policy parameter values listed in the top
section; non-policy parameter values from tables 3.2 and 3.3; and the specific combination α1 = 0.33 and α2 = 0.67.
The “Initial” column is the calibrated policy from table 3.2 and table 3.3. The “Optimal” column is the policy that
maximizes (3.4) conditional upon zero systemic risk (SRagg = 0). The “Restricted Optimal (κ1reg = κ
2
reg)” column
is the optimal policy with the additional restriction that bank capital requirements must be equal. The “Only Optimal
Penalty” column is the policy that increases the ex post penalty parameter according to the optimal policy but keeps
the initial capital requirements.
which the regulator finds it more cost effective to use capital requirements to achieve any remain-
ing systemic risk reduction.7 This outcome is indeed the case for the benchmark calibration, and
hence the optimal policy in table 3.4 tightens both capital requirements and the ex post penalty.
The optimality of the capital surcharge for bank 1 is due to bank heterogeneity and the reg-
ulator’s objective. The only difference between the two banks in the calibration is their speed
parameter (αb). The faster speed of selling (lower αb value) for bank 1 means that the bank incurs
7Interestingly, the marginal return to raising capital requirements is actually increasing in the level of the capital
requirement. This outcome occurs because there is a positive feedback effect in terms of reducing capital shortfall
from lower leverage.
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a smaller realized loss due to the fire sale. As a result, the ex ante portfolio choice of bank 1
is significantly less affected by the ex post penalty. We can see this outcome in the “Only Opti-
mal Penalty” column in table 3.4, which shows the equilibrium outcomes if only the optimal ex
post penalty is implemented relative to the initial calibration. In this case, bank 1 only reduces
its relative portfolio holding of asset 3 from 12.8% to 11.0%; meanwhile bank 2 reduces its rela-
tive holding from 12.3% to 4.4%. This larger decrease in ex ante holdings of asset 3 reflects the
fact that bank 2 is more penalized by the higher ex post penalty parameter. This interpretation is
confirmed by the larger decrease in the value of bank 2’s objective function (from 1.376 to 1.347)
compared to bank 1 (from 1.376 to 1.352). Given an objective to maximize the average bank value,
the regulator makes up for this disparity by increasing capital requirements for bank 1 only (i.e.,
the capital surcharge).
As further evidence for the optimality of the capital surcharge, the average bank value (V avg)
under the optimal policy would be smaller if the regulator restricted itself to policies with equal
capital requirements (i.e., no capital surcharge). This outcome is shown in the “Restricted Optimal
(κ1reg = κ
2
reg)” column of table 3.4. The restricted optimal policy is to increase capital requirements
for both banks to 10.9% and to significantly increase the ex post penalty parameter. The average
objective function value is 0.1268, which is lower than the value of 0.1280 for the unrestricted
optimal policy. Although it is not suprising that restricting the regulator’s choice set yields a worse
objective outcome, it is interesting to see that bank 1 is better off than bank 2 (i.e., has a higher
objective function value) as a result of the restricted optimal policy (V 1 = 0.1270 > 1.265 = V 2).
We observe the opposite outcome under the unrestricted optimal policy (V 1 = 0.1212 < 1.347 =
V 2) due to the large capital surcharge for bank 1.
The result that bank 1 is made relatively worse off compared to bank 2 by the optimal policy
can be explained as follows. Bank 1, through its speed advantage, effectively creates an externality
on bank 2 in the form of a larger capital shortfall due to additional fire sale losses. In the initial
equilibrium under the benchmark calibration, only bank 1 is selling asset 3 and triggering a price
impact (i.e., a higher Ψ3), which creates an unrealized loss for bank 2. As the regulator increases
the ex post penalty parameter, bank 2 also begins to sell asset 3 and incurs a realized loss instead.
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However, bank 1 makes this realized loss for bank 2 larger by maintaining a large holding of asset
3 (12.7% of its portfolio) that has significant price impact when sold. So not only is bank 1 less
affected by the ex post penalty parameter, but its lessened response to higher penalties creates
larger losses for bank 2. Thus it makes sense that bank 1 is effectively more penalized than bank
2 in the optimal policy. In fact, we see in table 3.4 that bank 1 negatively contributes to systemic
risk under the optimal policy.8
As a final step, I investigate how the optimal policies change depending on the assumed cross-
sectional distribution of the bank-specific “speed” parameter {α1, α2}. In figure 3.5, I show the
optimal policies and select equilibrium outcomes for different combinations of α1 and α2. The
optimal bank 2 capital requirement
(
κ2reg
)
remains at 8% and therefore is not shown in the figure.
The top left panel shows that the optimal capital surcharge for bank 1 (κ1reg minus κ
2
reg) is 6% to
8%. The top right panel shows that the optimal ex post penalty parameter is always significantly
higher than the benchmark calibrated value (the dotted line) and is generally increasing in both α1
and α2, with one exception (high α1 and α2 = 0.70). Consistent with the large capital surcharge,
the bottom left panel shows that bank 1 always has a negative systemic risk contribution. Finally,
we see that both banks end up selling asset 3 during the fire sale, resulting in a higher fire sale
price impact (bottom right panel; dotted line shows the initial value). In sum, we see the optimal
policies are qualitatively similar to the benchmark optimal policy in table 3.4.
8A negative contribution to systemic risk occurs when the bank’s distressed capital ratio at the end of t = 1 is above
the fixed systemic risk threshold (ζ), which does not depend on regulation.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Policies for Different Cross Sections
Non-policy parameter values from table 3.2 and table 3.3. The optimal capital requirement for bank 2 is not shown
above and is κ2reg = 0.08. The capital requirement surcharge for bank 1 is the additional minimum requirement for
bank 1 compared to bank 2
(
κ1reg − κ2reg
)
. The dotted lines in the top right and bottom right panels are the benchmark
calibration values. Further calibration details are discussed in appendix D.
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CHAPTER 4
RELATION TO CURRENT REGULATORY POLICY
In this chapter, I discuss how the model insights and quantitative results relate to the new
regulatory framework for banks in the US. I find that, in general, my results for the least costly
policies to mitigate systemic risk are consistent with the steps that have been implemented since
2010. I also identify how some of the new macroprudential regulatory tools can potentially address
the endogenous fire sale channel directly. This discussion is not exhaustive of the many changes
to the regulatory landscape over the past decade, but rather it is meant to highlight the key areas in
which the analysis in this study is most applicable. I do not discuss the many proposals for tools
or schemes that have not yet gained significant traction in the US, although they might address the
concerns raised in my analysis.1
4.1 Capital Requirements
The first significant post-crisis change to the regulatory framework came in 2010. Lawmakers
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”),
a piece of legislation described by some as the “most significant reregulation of the banking indus-
try since Glass-Steagall.”2 Dodd-Frank led to two particularly notable changes: (1) an increase in
the minimum capital requirement ratio of 2% for all banks,3 and (2) the establishment of enhanced
1An example of a proposed capital tool is contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), which is debt that is converted to
equity in response to a triggering event. These hybrid securities offer a way to reduce risk shifting and “bail in”
creditors, but there are concerns about their benefits in practice (see the discussion in Thakor 2014). Initial evidence
from CoCos issued in Europe suggests that uncertainty about regulatory discretion is an additional concern in
practice (Gleason, Bright, Martinez, and Taylor 2017). Other proposals include two kinds of capital requirements
(Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor 2016), required preemptive rights offerings when capital too low (Duffie 2011),
minimum capital levels based on the prices of credit default swaps (Hart and Zingales, 2011), and many more.
2From a February 13, 2012 letter written by the Chief Investment Officer of the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS) to all regulatory agencies.
3Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 198 (Friday, October 11, 2013).
41
prudential standards for institutions deemed “systemically important.” This latter change includes
a capital surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).4
My quantitative policy results regarding optimal capital requirements are broadly consistent
with the changes to capital requirements described above. In section 3.3, I found that the least
costly policies to mitigate systemic risk involve a capital surcharge 6% to 8% on the banks that
can best offset price impact. These banks correspond to the largest banks in the data, specifically
the G-SIBs. In the finalized 2015 rule, regulators decided that these banks would be subject to a
capital surcharge of 1% to 4.5% depending on regulatory assessment.5 The stated rationale for the
G-SIB surcharge is (1) to create incentives for the G-SIBs to shrink their systemic footprint and
(2) to combat the funding advantage that G-SIBs enjoy from being perceived as “too big to fail.”
Although similar, the rationale for the bank 1 capital surcharge in my setting differs in the source
of the benefit. Specifically, the surcharge compensates for bank 1’s speed advantage and role in
creating fire sale losses for other banks. Thus, my findings offer a fire-sale-based justification for
the G-SIB surcharge.
4.2 Ex Post Penalty
The ex post shortfall penalty parameter in the model (φ) represents the costs that a bank’s
equity holders expect to pay as the result of being undercapitalized during a crisis. Although
captured in a single parameter, these penalties have two fundamentally different sources: distress
and regulatory. For the purpose of policy analysis, I considered φ to be a regulatory parameter
under the assumption that the regulator has both the ability to offset distress costs and to increase
regulatory penalties. Importantly, regulatory penalties are assumed to take the form of restrictions
or forced actions that lower the market value of equity, as opposed to penalties assessed to the bank
that would directly weaken its capital level. This distinction is important because it means that
reducing anticipated assistance in offsetting distress costs is functionally equivalent to increasing
the regulatory parameter.
4See Federal Register, Vol. 80, No. 157, (Friday, August 14, 2015).
5See “Calibrating the GSIB Surcharge,” Federal Reserve Board, July 20, 2015 available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2015-calibrating-thegsib-surcharge-introduction.htm.
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Both regulatory statements and actions signal that distressed banks are now more likely to be
allowed to fail relative to before the crisis. The full title of Dodd-Frank explicitly mentions that the
act is intended to end “too big to fail,” which is the idea that large banks would expect to be bailed
out by regulators during a crisis. This expectation, along with the corresponding moral hazard, was
believed to have been a significant contributing factor to the severity of the financial crisis (Thakor
2015). Dodd-Frank also requires large banks to submit “living wills” (also known as “resolution
plans”) each year that specify how the bank is to be wound down in time of distress.6 Moreover,
Dodd-Frank created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), allowing the federal government to
take over and wind down a failing financial institution even if it is not a commercial bank.7
In sum, equity holders should expect the value of their claims to decline more in the event of
a crisis, which translates into a higher φ through the lens of the model. Recent policy changes are
therefore consistent with the optimal policies found in section 3.3. In line with model predictions,
Ignatowski and Korte (2014) provide empirical evidence that US banks now subject to the OLA
have responded by reducing their riskiness. Duffie (ming) notes that creditors seem convinced that
banks are more likely to be allowed to fail according to credit default swap spreads and unsecured
borrowing rates.
4.3 Regulatory Stress Tests
Annual stress tests have been a significant addition to the regulatory toolkit since 2012. This an-
nual exercise is formally known as the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). The
purpose is to ensure that the largest banks have “sufficient capital to continue operations through-
out times of economic and financial stress.”8 In the exercise, banks submit their plans to make
capital distributions (dividend payments or stock repurchases), and the Federal Reserve evaluates
6These resolution plans are also published on the Federal Reserve website:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm.
7Prior to the crisis, the FDIC’s authority was restricted to commercial banks. See Aaron Klein, “A primer on
Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority,” Brookings Up Front, June 5, 2017.
8https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm
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the banks’ hypothetical capital ratios under multiple adverse economic scenarios. If a bank is pro-
jected to be undercapitalized in any of these scenarios, the bank fails the stress test. As a result, its
proposed capital distribution plan is likely rejected and the bank will also likely not be allowed to
pay dividends.9
Stress tests impact a bank’s portfolio choice in the same way as raising the ex post penalty
parameter in the model. By disallowing dividend payments, a bank is effectively penalized today
for a capital shortfall in a future distressed state of the world. In the model, banks internalize
the impact from expected penalties in the crisis state at t = 1 into the portfolio choice at t = 0
(see, e.g., figure 3.3(b)). As a result, increasing the penalty parameter φ causes banks to shift their
portfolio at t = 0. This ex ante shift represents the present value of the impact from a higher ex
post penalty. From this perspective, increasing the ex post penalty can be interpreted as making
the stress test scenarios more severe.
Stress tests offer a potential antidote to the endogenous fire sale channel, but this promise may
not hold in practice. Despite acting like an increase in the ex post penalty parameter, increasing the
severity of the stress tests does not actually require imposing a larger ex post penalty. Therefore
banks are not more incentivized to sell as proposition 1 predicts, and the endogenous fire sale
channel should not be a concern. This conclusion has two problems. First, banks may learn to
game the stress tests over time, rendering them ineffective. Second, stress tests are expensive for
both regulators and the bank. As a result, there have been recent calls to conduct stress tests less
frequently and also to exclude more banks from full participation.10
9The punishment is determined at the regulator’s discretion. According to Hirtle and Lehnert (2014): “If the CCAR
qualitative assessment reveals significant weaknesses ... the bank holding company may make only those dividend
payments and share repurchases approved by the Federal Reserve and must resubmit its capital plan after addressing
the concerns raised in the initial review. Depending on the nature and extent of the concerns about a bank holding
company’s capital plan and current capital position, the Federal Reserve could require the company to stop dividend
payments and share repurchases entirely or could permit these actions within certain bounds.”
10In 2017, only 13 of the 34 banks included in CCAR were required to participate in the full stress testing exercise
(quantitative and qualitative). Reducing “significant burden on these firms” is the stated reason for exempting so
many banks from the qualitative assessment. See
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20170130a.htm
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4.4 Countercyclical Capital Buffer
The countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is a new addition to the Federal Reserve’s toolkit.
Introduced in the 2010 Basel III Accord,11, the CCyB is meant to protect the banking sector from
periods of excess credit growth and leverage buildup.12 It works by allowing the Federal Reserve
to increase minimum capital requirements by up to 2.5% when systemic risk is perceived to be
high.
In the model, a CCyB could be represented as a conditional buffer added to the bank’s minimum
capital requirements that has a value of zero in the crisis state. Formally, a CCyB of η would imply
that capital shortfall at t = 1 is computed as
E1 + CS1
w′A1
= κreg + η (4.1)
This definition is identical to (2.12) when η = 0. This implementation, however, is not quite the
same as the CCyB is intended to function. A more accurate and complete representation would
provide a signal to the regulator about the shock at t = 0, and the regulator would implement the
CCyB based on this signal.
Including a CCyB would appear to allow the regulator to avoid the endogenous fire sale chan-
nel. When banks are deciding whether to sell during t = 1, the relevant capital ratio is only κreg.
Therefore, by proposition 1, the bank has less incentive to sell compared to the case when the
relevant capital ratio is κreg + η. The regulator, however, still benefits from forcing banks to hold
more capital initially.
In practice, however, the CCyB faces many challenges. First of all, the regulator needs to
11Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
which is an international committee of banking supervisory authorities. The goal of the framework is to strengthen
the regulation, supervision, and risk management of the banking sector. See
hrefhttp://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htmhttp://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
12In addition to being part of the US Basel III implementation, the CCyB also addresses the provision in Dodd-Frank
that the regulatory agencies “shall seek to make such [capital] requirements countercyclical, so that the amount of
capital required to be maintained by a company increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of
economic contraction, consistent with the safety and soundness of the company.” See 12 U.S.C. 1467a; 12 U.S.C.
1844; 12 U.S.C. 3907 (as amended by section 616 of the Dodd-Frank).
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enact it before a crisis occurs and with sufficient lag so that banks can raise the needed capital.
Such foresight is understandably difficult to expect (Adrian, de Fontnouvelle, Yang, and Zlate
2017). Second, regulators have little experience with CCyBs. The Federal Reserve only finalized
its framework for planned future implementation of a CCyB in October 2016.13 The literature has
only just begun to address the issue (see, e.g., Davydiuk 2017).
4.5 Liquidity Requirements
In additional to raising capital requirements, regulators have also introduced new liquidity re-
quirements since the crisis. These requirements effectively limit the extent to which banks can hold
long-term illiquid portfolios given short-term debt. The belief is that banks engaged in “excessive”
maturity transformation prior to the crisis, which made solvent institutions vulnerable to runs and
created additional distress during the height of the crisis (e.g., Yellen 2014). Introduced as part
of Basel III, liquidity requirements take the form of a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net
stable funding ratio (NSFR). The LCR requires that a bank has enough high-quality liquid assets
to meet withdrawals during a 30-day run scenario. The NSFR requires that a bank has sufficient
stable (i.e., long-term) funding to withstand an extended period of market distress (up to one year).
In the US, banks have been required to comply with a LCR since 2015 while an NSFR is still in
development.14
If taken literally, the LCR and NSFR would not have any impact if introduced within my model
framework because the assets and bank debt are both long-term with the same maturity (t = 2).
However, suppose that we interpret all bank debt in the model as one-period and that the ex post
shortfall penalty (φ) captures all of the distress costs from rolling over this debt during the crisis.
In this case, I can represent a LCR as a required minimum relative holding for asset 2
Abt,2
1′Abt
≥ `
13See Federal Reserve Systemic Docket No. R-1529 RIN 7100 AE-43, 2016-21970. See also 12 CFR 217, Appendix
A.
14For the LCR rule, see Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 197, (Friday, October 10, 2014). The June 2016 NSFR
proposal can be found at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-06-01/pdf/2016-11505.pdf.
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where ` is specified by the regulator. Note that this constraint must bind in every period, which is
a feature of the LCR in practice. The above constraint nests my model as described in chapter 2 in
which ` = 0.
The LCR described above offers a potentially more cost-effective way to reduce systemic risk
compared to the ex post penalty. In chapter 3, we saw that increasing the ex post penalty parameter
(φ) reduces systemic risk by causing a bank to shift its portfolio towards asset 2. Using the LCR,
the regulator could achieve similar systemic risk reduction by setting the liquidity requirement
parameter (`) equal to the asset 2 portfolio share that would be observed under the larger ex post
penalty parameter. This approach offers the added benefit that it will not induce additional selling
during a fire sale because banks’ ex post selling decisions are unaffected. However, the LCR also
generates a distinct cost relative to the ex post penalty in terms of excess liquidity. The LCR
prevents banks from deploying excess liquidity even during a crisis, which implies a potentially
large social cost (Diamond and Kashyap 2016).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
To study the impact of bank capital regulation on systemic risk, I have developed a model with
heterogeneous banks and endogenous fire sales. The decisions of individual banks affect the losses
of others through a fire sale externality that can occur in a crisis state, and a regulator can influence
bank behavior (and therefore systemic risk) through two capital-based policy tools: ex ante capital
requirements and ex post shortfall penalties.
My analysis delivers three key results. First, I show the existence of an endogenous fire sale
channel through which tighter capital regulation can unintentionally lead to higher systemic risk.
Second, I show in a calibrated version of the model that the least costly policies to mitigate systemic
risk raise both ex ante capital requirements and ex post shortfall penalties. This result highlights
that these regulatory tools provide systemic risk reduction with different cost-benefit tradeoffs.
Third, these least costly risk-mitigation policies assign relatively higher capital requirements to
banks that can better offset price declines during a fire sale. This capital surcharge is the result of
bank heterogeneity and the regulator’s objective.
My findings have two broad implications for current and future regulatory policy. First, my
quantitative results are consistent with the recently implemented enhanced prudential standards for
institutions deemed “systemically important” and, in particular, the capital surcharge for the global
systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Therefore, my results provide a fire-sale-based justifica-
tion for the current regulatory regime. Second, my findings provide further support for leading-
edge macroprudential tools, including stress tests and countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs).
Their key potential advantage is to reduce systemic risk without triggering the endogenous fire
sale channel.
Further research should expand this framework to include other sectors of the economy. For
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example, I currently model in reduced form outside investors who provide liquidity during a fire
sale. It would be interesting to consider how changes in banking regulation indirectly affect this
group of investors and consequently their role in fire sales. These investors likely play in large
role in the recovery following a financial crisis, particularly in the provision of capital. Addressing
these types of questions will help to advance the broader agenda of a welfare analysis of the current
and hypothetical regulatory regimes.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof Proposition 1 From lemma B.0.1, the expression for the optimal asset 3 selling choice of
bank b ignoring the lower and upper bounds is
1− (µ3 −RD)− φ
[(
1− αb − κbregw3
)
Ψ3 + κ
b
regw3
]
γσ23A
b
0,3/E
b
0
(A.1)
This expression is increasing in φ because
(
1− αb − κbregw3
)
Ψ3 + κ
b
regw3 =
(
1− αb)Ψ3 + (1−Ψ3)κbregw3 > 0
given that αb ∈ (0, 1) and Ψ3 ∈ [0, 1]. This expression is also increasing in κbreg because (1−Ψ3) ∈
[0, 1] as well.
The expression in (A.1) is increasing in Ψ3 only if
(
1− αb − κbregw3
)
> 0, which is equivalent
to
αb < 1− κbregw3
Finally, the expression in (A.1) is weakly decreasing in αb because Ψ3 ∈ [0, 1]. If Ψ3 > 0, the
expression is strictly decreasing in αb. The consequence of increasing αb is that the bank receives a
lower price when selling during a fire sale. Therefore, in words, the bank’s optimal selling decision
is weakly increasing in its ability to offset price impact.
In lemma B.0.1, the optimal selling choice (s∗3) is bounded between 0 and 1. If the optimal
choice is strictly below or above these boundaries (s∗3 < 0 or s
∗
3 > 1), all partial derivatives are
zero. Therefore, as a general statement, the optimal selling choice can only be described as weakly
increasing in
{
φ, κbreg,Ψ3
}
and weakly decreasing in
{
αb
}
.
Proof Proposition 3 For an optimally chosen level of selling (s∗3) and portfolio choice (A∗0), the
50
net capital shortfall generated from asset 3 (CS3) is
CS3 ≡ {[(1− κregw3) (1− s∗3) + αs∗3] Ψ3 − s∗3κregw3}A∗0,3 (A.2)
Take the partial derivative with respect to Ψ3
∂CS3
∂Ψ3
= [(1− κregw3) (1− s∗3) + αs∗3]A∗0,3 (A.3)
+ {[(1− κregw3) (1− s∗3) + αs∗3] Ψ3 − s∗3κregw3}
∂A∗0,3
∂Ψ3
This partial derivative is positive if
−∂A∗0,3
∂Ψ3
A∗0,3
<
(1− κregw3) (1− s∗3) + αs∗3
[(1− κregw3) (1− s∗3) + αs∗3] Ψ3 − s∗3κregw3
(A.4)
In words, the percent decline in asset 3 holding must not be too large. We will see below in (A.6)
that
∂A∗0,3
∂Ψ3
< 0 with certainty and so the left-hand side represents always the percent decline in
holding. The right-hand side is greater than or equal to 1. If s3 > 0 then it is greater than 1 with
certainty.
From lemma B.0.2, the expression for the optimal asset 3 holding is
γ
(
1− q + q (1− s3)2
)
σ23
E0
A∗0,3 = (1− qs3) (µ3 −RD) (A.5)
− qφ ([(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3)
−
w′Σ−1 (µ− c)− γκreg(1+β)
w′Σ
−1
w
w3
+ Z3
where we have removed the non-negativity multplier (Γx,3 = 0) because we are assuming that the
asset 3 holding is positive. In the remainder of the proof, we will assume that either s3 = 0 or
s3 = 1. If a set of parameters delivers our outcome of interest at either of these extremes then we
know the outcome will also hold for values of s3 in between. Because we assume s3 = 0 or s3 = 1,
we can set Z3 = 0.
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Using expressions as needed from lemma B.0.2 and assuming Z3 = 0, take the partial deriva-
tive of (A.5)
∂x∗0,3
∂Ψ3
=
E0
γ
(
1− q + q (1− s3)2
)
σ23
−qφ [(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3]
1−
w23
(1−q+q(1−s3)2)σ23
w′Σ−1w

 (A.6)
Combine (A.5) and (A.6) to form an expression for the percent decline in holding
− ∂A
∗
0,3
∂Ψ3
A∗0,3
=
qφ1 [(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3]
1− w
2
3
(1−q+q(1−s3)2)σ23
w′Σ−1w

(1− qs3) (µ3 −RD)− qφ1 ([(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3)−
w′Σ−1(µ−c)− γ
κreg(1+β)
w′Σ−1w
w3
If s3 = 0, the condition for ∂CS3∂Ψ3 > 0 is
qφ1 (1− κregw3)
(
1−
w23
σ23
w′Σ−1w
)
µ3 −RD − qφ1 (1− κregw3) Ψ3 −
w′Σ−1(µ−c)− γ
κreg(1+β)
w′Σ−1w
w3
<
1
Ψ3
Given that the Lagrange multiplier term must be non-negative, we know that
qφ1 (1− κregw3)
(
1−
w23
σ23
w′Σ−1w
)
µ3 −RD − qφ1 (1− κregw3) Ψ3 −
w′Σ−1(µ−c)− γ
κreg(1+β)
w′Σ−1w
w3
<
qφ1 (1− κregw3)
µ3 −RD − qφ1 (1− κregw3) Ψ3
Therefore a sufficient condition for our outcome of interest is
qφ1 (1− κregw3)
µ3 −RD − qφ1 (1− κregw3) Ψ3 <
1
Ψ3
Take the inverse of both sides to find
µ3 −RD
2qφ1 (1− κregw3) > Ψ3 (A.7)
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If s3 = 1 then the condition for capital shortfall due to asset 3 increasing
(
∂CS3
∂Ψ3
> 0
)
is
qφ1
(
1−
w23
(1−q)σ23
w′Σ−1w
)
(1− q) (µ3 −RD)− qφ1 (αΨ3 − κregw3)−
w′Σ−1(µ−c)− γ
κreg(1+β)
w′Σ−1w
w3
<
1
αΨ3 − κregw3
Follow a similar process to find
(1− q) (µ3 −RD)
2qφ1
+ κregw3 > αΨ3 (A.8)
In conclusion, we can combine the sufficient conditions in (A.7) and (A.8) to the find the following
single sufficient condition such that capital shortfall due to asset 3 is increasing in Ψ3
min
{
µ3 −RD
2qφ
(
1− κbregw3
) , (1− q) (µ3 −RD) + κregw32qφ
2qφαb
}
> Ψ3 (A.9)
Assumption 1: Probability of Crisis (q) Sufficiently Small. Suppose that a bank optimally
chooses portfolio (A∗0) and capital buffer (β
∗ ≥ 0) given an equilibrium asset 3 price decline (Ψ3)
under the assumption that it cannot purchase asset 3 during a fire sale. Suppose further that the
bank is weakly undercapitalized in the crisis state (CS∗1 ≥ 0) as a result of these optimal decisions.
If it could purchase asset 3 during a fire sale, the bank may want to hold a portfolio (A∗∗0 ) and
capital buffer (β∗∗ > β∗) that ensures it is overcapitalized in the crisis state (CS∗∗1 < 0) so it
can purchase asset 3 cheaply. The expected profit from this trade is the probability of a crisis (q)
multplied by the price return from purchasing asset 3 at at discount (1/(1−Ψ3)) multplied by the
amount of asset 3 it can purchase. A bank is limited in its ability to purchase asset 3 by its available
holding of asset 2, which it sells in order to purchase asset 3 cheaply.
If q = 0, this strategy has zero expected profit and therefore a bank will optimally choose
{A∗0, β∗} if given the choice. As q increases, the expected profit from the trade increases and
this additional benefit can eventually outweigh the objective function value loss from choosing
{A∗∗0 , β∗∗} instead of {A∗0, β∗}. This threshold value for q, if it exists, is an upper bound for the
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bank-specific “sufficiently small” value to avoid following the purchase strategy. Let us denote this
value qb.
If the bank does switch to the “purchase” strategy, the equilibrium asset 3 price decline (Ψ3)
will become smaller for two reasons. First, the bank may have been selling under its old strategy
and therefore no longer contributes to the aggregate quantity of asset 3 sold. Second, the bank
will be purchasing asset 3 and therefore further reducing the aggregate quantity sold. Both effects
reduce the aggregate quantity of asset 3 sold, which is the input to the price impact function. As a
result, the asset 3 price decline (Ψ3) would necessarily become smaller. Therefore qb is potentially
much larger than the threshold value of q for which the bank would switch strategies given Ψ3, and
it may even be larger than 1.
The final “sufficiently small” value for q is the minimum value of qb among all banks, which
will guarantee that no bank follows the strategy to hold additional capital in order to purchase asset
3 at a fire sale price.
54
APPENDIX B
OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
Lemma B.0.1 Optimal Selling Decisions. If ξ˜ = 0, optimal selling is zero for both assets by
assumption (s∗2 = 0 and s
∗
3 = 0). See footnote 2 for the explanation.
If ξ˜ = ξ, optimal selling decisions are
s∗3 = min {s∗∗3 , s3} (B.1)
s∗2 = min {s∗∗2 , s2} (B.2)
where
s∗∗3 =

0 φ ≤ φ
1− (µ3−RD)−φ[(1−α−κregw3)Ψ3+κregw3]
γσ23A0,3/E0
φ ∈ (φ, φ)
1 φ ≥ φ
(B.3)
φ ≡ µ3 −RD − γσ
2
3A0,3/E0
(1− α− κregw3) Ψ3 + κregw3 (B.4)
φ ≡ µ3 −RD
(1− α− κregw3) Ψ3 + κregw3 (B.5)
and
s3 =
max
{
(1− κregw1) ξA0,1 + (1− κregw3) Ψ3A0,3 −
(
1− 1
1+β
)
E0, 0
}
[(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3]A0,3 (B.6)
and
s∗∗2 =

0 φ ≤ µ2−RD−γσ22A0,2/E0
κregw2
1− (µ2−RD)−φκregw2
γσ22A0,2/E0
µ2−RD−γσ22A0,2/E0
κregw2
< φ < µ2−RD
κregw2
1 φ ≥ µ2−RD
κregw2
(B.7)
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and
s2 =
max
{
(1− κregw1) ξA0,1 −
(
1− 1
1+β
)
+ {αΨi − κregw3}A0,3, 0
}
κregw2A0,2
(B.8)
Proof Suppose that ξ˜ = ξ. A bank chooses optimal selling for asset 2 and 3 (s2 and s3) to solve
the following problem
max
s2∈[0,1],s3∈[0,1]
E0
[
R˜E | ξ˜ = ξ
]
− γ
2
V ar0
[
R˜E | ξ˜ = ξ
]
(B.9)
Plug in the expressions for R˜E , A1, D1, and Φ and ξ˜ = ξ and then take expectations. The rewritten
problem is
max
s2∈[0,1],s3∈[0,1]
µˆ (ξ)′A0 +RD − ICS1≥0φCS1 −
γ
2E0
A′0Σˆ (ξ)A0 + Γ
′
0s+ Γ
′
1 (1− s) (B.10)
where
CS1
E0
= (1− κregw1) ξA0,1 −
(
1− 1
1 + β
)
E0 − s2κregw2A0,2 (B.11)
+ {[(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3}A0,3
and I have defined
µˆ (ξ) ≡

µ1 (1− ξ)−RD
(1− s2) (µ2 −RD)
(1− s3) (µ3 −RD)
 (B.12)
Σˆ (ξ) ≡

(1− ξ)2 σ21 0 0
0 (1− s2)2 σ22 0
0 0 (1− s3)2 σ23
 (B.13)
and Γ0 and Γ1 are vectors of Lagrange multipliers for the lower and upper bounds of s2 and s3. The
indicator function ICS1≥0 captures that the penalty is only paid if capital shortfall is non-negative.
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The first order conditions for s2 and s3 are
0 =− (µ2 −RD)A0,2 + ICS1≥0φκregw2A0,2 (B.14)
− γ
2E0
A′0
[
∂
∂s2
Σˆ (ξ)
]
A0 + Γ0,2 − Γ1,2
0 =− (µ3 −RD)A0,3 + ICS1≥0φ [(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3]A0,3 (B.15)
− γ
2E0
A′0
[
∂
∂s3
Σˆ (ξ)
]
A0 + Γ0,3 − Γ1,3
Given our assumption that Σ is diagonal (assumption 2), the expressions for the partial derivatives
of Σˆ (ξ) are
γ
2E0
A′0
[
∂
∂s2
Σˆ (ξ)
]
A0 = − γ
2E0
2 (1− s∗∗2 ) (−1)σ2x20,2 (B.16)
γ
2E0
A′0
[
∂
∂s3
Σˆ (ξ)
]
A0 = − γ
2E0
2 (1− s∗∗3 ) (−1)σ23x20,3 (B.17)
so therefore we have
0 =− (µ2 −RD)x0,2 + ICS1≥0φκregw2x0,2 + γ (1− s∗∗2 )σ22x20,2 + Γ0,2 − Γ1,2 (B.18)
0 =− (µ3 −RD)x0,3 + ICS1≥0φ [(1− α) Ψ3 + (1−Ψ3)κregw3]x0,3 (B.19)
+ γ (1− s∗∗3 )σ23x20,3 + Γ0,3 − Γ1,3
Note that each s∗∗i for i ∈ {2, 3} corresponds to the maximum because that the second derivative
is
− γ
E0
σ2i x
2
0,i < 0 (B.20)
Rearrange and simplify to find
s∗∗2 = 1−
(µ2 −RD)− ICS1≥0φκregw2
γσ22A0,2/E0
+
Γ0,2 − Γ1,2
γσ22A0,2/E0
(B.21)
s∗∗3 = 1−
(µ3 −RD)− ICS1≥0φ [(1− α) Ψ3 + (1−Ψ3)κregw3]
γσ23A0,3/E0
+
Γ0,3 − Γ1,3
γσ23A0,3/E0
(B.22)
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Both expressions are decreasing in φ. Therefore these expressions can be equivalently written as
cases according to the value of φ without the Lagrange multiplers for the lower and upper bounds
as in (B.3) and (B.7).
Suppose that CS1 ≥ 0 given s∗∗2 and s∗∗3 assuming that ICS1≥0 = 1. In this case, the optimal
selling decisions are exactly s∗∗2 and s
∗∗
3 . If instead we find CS1 < 0 given s
∗∗
2 and s
∗∗
3 then the we
have a corner solution. A bank will never optimally choose to sell beyond the amount that achieves
CS1 = 0 because there is no more benefit from reducing the penalty beyond this point. Given a
corner solution, we must figure out which asset the bank sells first. Even if Ψ3 = 0, we see that the
bank would sell its entire holding of asset 3 before asset 2 if
w3 >
µ3 −RD
µ2 −RDw2 (B.23)
This condition is guaranteed by assumption 3 and my calibration for risk weights in (3.1). As a
result, we can define the expression for the largest share of asset 3 holdings that the bank will sell
s3 =
max
{
(1− κregw1) ξA0,1 + (1− κregw3) Ψ3A0,3 −
(
1− 1
1+β
)
E0, 0
}
[(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3]A0,3 (B.24)
This quantity s3 represents the amount of asset 3 selling in order for CS1 = 0. The max operator
signifies that the bank will sell nothing if capital shortfall is already negative (CS1 < 0). If s3 ≤ 1,
it is an upper bound to the optimal selling value and hence we conclude
s∗3 = min {s∗∗3 , s3} (B.25)
If s3 > 1, we may still be at a corner solution if the bank can achieve CS1 = 0 by selling asset 2.
The expression for the largest share of asset 2 holdings that the bank will sell
s2 =
max
{
(1− κregw1) ξA0,1 −
(
1− 1
1+β
)
+ {αΨi − κregw3}A0,3, 0
}
κregw2A0,2
(B.26)
This quantity represents the amount of asset 2 selling in order for CS1 = 0 given that s3 = 1. Like
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s3, s2 is an upper bound to the optimal selling value and hence we conclude
s∗2 = min {s∗∗2 , s2} (B.27)
Lemma B.0.2 Optimal Portfolio. The optimal 3x1 portfolio vector for bank b is
Ab∗0 =
Eb0
γ
Σ
−1
µ− c+ Γx − max
{
w′Σ
−1
(µ− c+ Γx)− γκreg(1+βb) , 0
}
w′Σ
−1
w
w
+ Zb (B.28)
where
µ ≡

(1− qξ)µ1 −RD(
1− qsb2
)
(µ2 −RD)(
1− qsb3
)
(µ3 −RD)
 (B.29)
c ≡ qφ× ICSb1≥0 ×

(
1− κbregw1
)
ξ
−sb2κbregw2[(
1− κbregw3
) (
1− sb3
)
+ αbsb3
]
Ψ3 − sb3κbregw3
 (B.30)
Σ ≡ (1− q)Σ + q ×

(1− ξ)2 σ21 0 0
0
(
1− sb2
)2
σ22 0
0 0
(
1− sb3
)2
σ23
 (B.31)
and Γx is the 3x1 vector of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the non-negativity constraints and Zb is
a 3x1 vector of terms that capture the effect of portfolio holdings on the selling decision at t = 1.
If sbi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {2, 3} then Zb = [0, 0, 0]′.
Proof In the following analysis, I suppress the bank-specific superscript to reduce notational clut-
ter. Plug in the expressions for
{
R˜E, A1, D1,Φ
}
and the distribution for ξ˜ to rewrite the bank
problem at t = 0 as
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max
xb0,β
b
(1− q)×
(
µ′x0 +RD − γ
2
x′0Σx0
)
(B.32)
+ q ×
(
µˆ (ξ)′ x0 +RD − γ
2
x′0Σˆ (ξ)x0 −
1
Eb0
Φ
)
subject to
1
w′x0
= κreg (1 + β) (B.33)
x0 ≥ 0 (B.34)
β ≥ 0 (B.35)
where
x0 ≡ 1
E0
A0 (B.36)
1
E0
Φ =φ×max
{
CS1
E0
, 0
}
(B.37)
CS1
E0
=
(
1
1 + β
− 1
)
+ (1− κregw1) ξx0,1 − s2κregw2x0,2 (B.38)
+ {[(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3}x0,3
µˆ (ξ) ≡

µ1 (1− ξ)−RD
(1− s2) (µ2 −RD)
(1− s3) (µ3 −RD)
 (B.39)
Σˆ (ξ) ≡

(1− ξ)2 σ21 0 0
0 (1− s2)2 σ22 0
0 0 (1− s3)2 σ23
 (B.40)
We normalize the holdings by E0 to avoid carrying around the E0 in the remaining analysis. We
have also incorporated the assumption that Σ is diagonal (assumption 2).
60
The Lagrangian is
L (Λ,Γx,Γβ) = (1− q)×
(
µ′x0 +RD − γ
2
x′0Σx0
)
(B.41)
+q ×
(
µˆ (ξ)′ x0 +RD − 1
E0
Φ− γ
2
x′0Σˆ (ξ)x0
)
(B.42)
+Λ (1− κreg (1 + β)w′x0) + Γ′xx0 + Γββ
Take the partial derivative with respect to x0
0 = (1− q)× (µ− γΣx0) (B.43)
+q ×
[
∂µˆ (ξ)′ x0
∂x0
− 1
E0
∂Φ
∂x0
− γ
(
∂
x0
(
1
2
x′0Σˆ (ξ)x0
))]
−Λκreg (1 + β)w + Γx
The above matrices partial derivatives are
∂µˆ (ξ)′ x0
∂x0
= µˆ (ξ)−

∑3
i=2
∂si
∂x0,1
(µi −RD)x0,i∑3
i=2
∂si
∂x0,2
(µi −RD)x0,i∑3
i=2
∂si
∂x0,3
(µi −RD)x0,i
 (B.44)
and
∂
∂x0
(
1
2
x′0Σˆ (ξ)x0
)
= Σˆ (ξ)x0 − z (ξ) (B.45)
where
z (ξ) ≡

0
(1− s2)σ22x20,2 ∂s2∂x0,2
(1− s3)σ23x20,3 ∂s3∂x0,3
 (B.46)
The partial derivative of Φ with respect to x0 is
1
E0
∂Φ
∂x0
= φ×max
∂
(
CS1
E0
)
∂x0
, 0

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For i = 1, the partial derivative is
∂
(
CS1
E0
)
∂x0,1
= (1− κregw1) ξ −
[
∂s2
∂x0,1
κregw2x0,2 +
∂s3
∂x0,1
{(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3
]
For i = 2, the partial derivative is
∂
(
CS1
E0
)
∂x0,2
= −s2κregw2 −
[
∂s2
∂x0,2
κregw2x0,2 +
∂s3
∂x0,2
{(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3
]
For i = 3, the partial derivative is
∂
(
CS1
E0
)
∂x0,3
= [(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3
−
[
∂s2
∂x0,3
κregw2x0,2 +
∂s3
∂x0,3
{(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3
]
Putting it all together, the optimality condition is
0 = µ− γΣx∗0 − γz − c− Λκreg (1 + β)w + Γx (B.47)
where
µ ≡

(1− qξ)µ1 −RD − q
∑3
i=2
∂si
∂x0,1
(µi −RD)x0,i
(1− qs2) (µ2 −RD)− q
∑3
i=2
∂si
∂x0,2
(µi −RD)x0,i
(1− qs2) (µ3 −RD)− q
∑3
i=2
∂si
∂x0,3
(µi −RD)x0,i

Σ ≡

(
1− q + q (1− ξ)2)σ21 0 0
0
(
1− q + q (1− s2)2
)
σ22 0
0 0
(
1− q + q (1− s3)2
)
σ23

z ≡ q

0
(1− s2)σ22x20,2 ∂s2∂x0,2
(1− s3)σ23x20,3 ∂s3∂x0,3

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and
c ≡ qφICS1≥0

(1− κregw1) ξ −
[
∂s2
∂x0,1
κregw2x0,2 +
∂s3
∂x0,1
{(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3
]
−s2κregw2 −
[
∂s2
∂x0,2
κregw2x0,2 +
∂s3
∂x0,2
{(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3
]
[(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3 −
[
∂s2
∂x0,3
κregw2x0,2 +
∂s3
∂x0,3
{(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3
]

Rearrange to find
x∗0 =
1
γ
Σ
−1
(µ− c− γz − Λκreg (1 + β)w + Γx)
If Λ > 0 then we know 1 = κreg (1 + β)w′x0. Multiply both sides of the above equation by
κreg (1 + β)w
′ and plug the above expression for x∗0 to find
1 =
1
γ
κreg (1 + β)w
′Σ
−1
(µ− c− γz − Λκreg (1 + β)w + Γx)
Rearrange further to find
Λ =
max
{
w′Σ
−1
(µ− c− γz + Γx)− γκreg(1+β) , 0
}
κreg (1 + β)w′Σ
−1
w
(B.48)
where the max operator incorporates the fact that Λ ≥ 0. Plug this expression back into the
optimality condition to get
x∗0 =
1
γ
Σ
−1
µ− c− γz + Γx − max
{
w′Σ
−1
(µ− c− γz + Γx)− γκreg(1+β) , 0
}
w′Σ
−1
w
w
 (B.49)
noting that the κreg (1 + β) term in the denominator of Λ cancels out with the κreg (1 + β) in
Λκreg (1 + β)w.
The expressions for ∂s2
∂x0,i
and ∂s3
∂x0,i
are messy (see lemma B.0.1 for the optimal expressions for
s2 and s3). However, we can simplify things immensely by noting that these expressions are zero
when s∗i = 0 or s
∗
i = 1 for i ∈ {2, 3}. From this perspective, we write the optimal portfolio as
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x∗0 =
1
γ
Σ
−1
µ− c+ Γx − max
{
w′Σ
−1
(µ− c+ Γx)− γκreg(1+β) , 0
}
w′Σ
−1
w
w
+ Z
where
µ ≡

(1− qξ)µ1 −RD
(1− qs2) (µ2 −RD)
(1− qs3) (µ3 −RD)

c ≡ qφ× ICS1≥0 ×

(1− κregw1) ξ
−sb2κbregw2
[(1− κregw3) (1− s3) + αs3] Ψ3 − s3κregw3

Σ ≡ (1− q)Σ + q ×

(1− ξ)2 σ21 0 0
0 (1− s2)2 σ22 0
0 0 (1− s3)2 σ23

and Z is a 3x1 vector that captures all of the terms related to ∂s2
∂x0,i
and ∂s3
∂x0,i
.
Lemma B.0.3 Optimal Capital Buffer (β). The optimal capital buffer for bank b satisfies
0 = β∗ × q ×
[
φ
[
1
(1 + β)2
+ κregw2x0,2
∂s2
∂β
+ {(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3∂s3
∂β
]
× ICS1≥0
]
+β∗ × q ×
[
3∑
i=2
[(
γ (1− si)σ2i x20,i − (µi −RD)x0,i
)(∂si
∂β
)]]
−Λ β
∗
1 + β∗
where Λ is the Lagrange multplier on the capital requirement constraint as shown in (B.48), Γβ
is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the non-negativity constraint, and the optimal selling expressions
are from lemma B.0.1.
Proof Start by taking the partial derivative of the Lagrangian as seen in (B.42) with respect to β
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0 = q ×
[
∂µˆ (ξ)′ x0
∂β
− 1
E0
∂Φ
∂β
− γ
(
∂
∂β
(
1
2
x′0Σˆ (ξ)x0
))]
− Λκregw′x0 + Γβ
The above matrices partial derivatives are
∂µˆ (ξ)′ x0
∂β
= −
3∑
i=2
∂si
∂β
(µi −RD)x0,i
and
∂
∂β
(
1
2
x′0Σˆ (ξ)x0
)
=
N∑
i=2
(1− si)σ2i x20,i
(
−∂si
∂β
)
The partial derivative of Φ with respect to x0 is
1
E0
∂Φ
∂β
= φ×max
∂
(
CS1
E0
)
∂β
, 0

The partial derivative within the max operator is
∂
(
CS1
E0
)
∂β
=
−1
(1 + β)2
− κregw2x0,2∂s2
∂β
− {(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3∂s3
∂β
Putting it all together, the optimality condition is
0 = q ×
[
φ
[
1
(1 + β)2
+ κregw2x0,2
∂s2
∂β
+ {(1− κregw3 − α) Ψ3 + κregw3}x0,3∂s3
∂β
]
× ICS1≥0
]
+q ×
[
3∑
i=2
[(
γ (1− si)σ2i x20,i − (µi −RD)x0,i
)(∂si
∂β
)]]
−Λ 1
1 + β
+ Γβ
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where we have substituted in the binding capital requirement constraint equation
1
w′x0
= κreg (1 + β)
and where Λ is the Lagrange multplier on the capital requirement constraint as shown in (B.48).
The three terms can be interpreted as follows:
• The first term is negative and shows that increasing β is costly because the bank sells less
and therefore reduces the penalty less
• The second term is positive and shows that increasing β is beneficial because it means the
bank needs to sell less
• The third term is positive and shows that increasing β is costly if it forces the bank to hold a
smaller portfolio that it otherwise would optimally hold
To help understand the optimal β value that satisfies the optimality condition, let us consider
the following cases.
Case 1: q = 0
In this case, β∗ = 0 if Λβ=0 > 0. Otherwise, β∗ = E0κregw′A0 − 1 > 0 meaning that the bank
prefers to hold a capital buffer purely because the assets returns are not sufficiently attractive to
level up to the point where leverage yields a capital ratio below κreg. The optimal portfolio is the
solution to the portfolio problem where the capital requirement effectively does not matter.
Case 2: CS1 ≤ 0 without any selling required
In this world ∂s3
∂β
= 0 and ∂s2
∂β
= 0 and also ICS1≥0 = 0 by the case assumption. In order for
this outcome to occur, we must have β∗ > 0 given that ξ > 0. This means β∗ = E0
κregw′A0
− 1 > 0
as in Case 1 and the interpretation is the same: the assets are not sufficiently attractive to hold high
leverage.
Case 3: CS1 = 0 with some positive selling
In this case, we have ∂s3
∂β
6= 0 or ∂s2
∂β
6= 0 because the bank has to be selling one of the
assets according to either s2 = s2 as in (B.8) or s3 = s3 as in (B.6). This is how the bank ends
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at CS1 = 0. We cannot simplify the optimality condition any further in this case and the optimal
β∗ ≥ 0 is the value that satisfies the equation. We can think of this case, however, as corresponding
to a sufficiently small ξ value. If the loss from the systematic shock (ξx0,1) is sufficiently small,
then the bank can sell.
Case 4: CS1 > 0 given optimal selling decisions
The only way for this outcome to occur is for s3 = s∗∗3 and s2 = s
∗∗
2 as in (B.3) or (B.7).
Otherwise CS1 = 0. Therefore the optimal selling decisions are not a function of β and ∂s3∂β = 0
and ∂s2
∂β
= 0. The optimality condition is reduced to
0 = qφ
[
1
(1 + β)2
]
− Λ 1
1 + β
+ Γβ
Because the first term is positive and Γβ ≥ 0, this means that we must have Λ > 0. Plug in the
expression for Λ from (B.48). Multiply both sides by (1 + β), utilize Γββ = 0, and rearrange to
find
β∗ =
γ
κreg
[
w′Σ
−1
(µ− c− γz + Γx)− (qφ+ Γβ)κregw′Σ−1w
]−1
− 1
or
β∗ = max
{
γ
κreg
[
w′Σ
−1
(µ− c− γz + Γx)− qφκregw′Σ−1w
]−1
− 1, 0
}
The expression inside the max operator effectively tells us that β∗ = 0 if
Λβ=0 − qφ > 0
This result makes sense that either q or φmust be larger enough to induce the bank to hold a capital
buffer if the bank would otherwise want to hold zero buffer based on the asset return parameters.
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APPENDIX C
DATA DETAILS
C.1 Bank Sample Construction
For the primary data source, I utilize bank holding company (BHC) data collected by the Fed-
eral Reserve through the Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C).
Raw data are downloaded from the Federal Reserve of Chicago website (https://chicagofed.org/
banking/financial-institution-reports/bhc-data). Throughout the description of the dataset, I use
the terms BHCs and banks interchangibly to refer to the entities in this dataset.
The FR Y-9C data broadly provides balance sheet and income statement information on a
quarterly basis. Of particular use in this study, it provides a detailed breakdown of securities
holdings both in the banking book and trading book (Schedules HC-B and HC-D). I am also able
to see contributions of these assets to regulatory ratios (Schedule HC-R).
Onto the FR Y-9C dataset, I merge equity returns, prices, and shares outstanding from CRSP us-
ing the FRBNY CRSP-FRB Link dataset. This dataset created and maintained by Federal Reserve
Bank of New York links PERMCOs from CRSP to RSSD identifiers (https://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/banking research/datasets.html). My final sample covers 2001Q1 through 2016Q4.
Banks that meet any of the following criteria are dropped from the dataset:
• Non-typical BHCs (AIG, American Express, Discover, Goldman Sachs, Metlife, Morgan
Stanley)
• Foreign owned BHCs , which are BHCs with a non-missing Financial High Holder ID
(RSSD9364)
• Savings and Loans Holding Companies, which are BHCs for which the entity type (RSSD9346)
is “SLHC”
• Banks that drop out of the FR Y-9C dataset in 2006Q1 because they are too small (under
$500 million in assets). Prior to 2006Q1, the minimum size threshold was $150 million in
assets.
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C.2 Key Variables Within FR Y-9C Dataset
Total Assets: BHCK2170.
Risk-Weighted Assets: BHCKA223 before 2014, BHCAA223 thereafter.
Tier 1 Capital: BHCK8274 before 2014, BHCA8274 thereafter.
Tier 1 Capital Ratio: BHCKA223 before 2014, BHCAA223 thereafter.
C.3 Constructing Time Series of Holdings for Security Types
The security types shown in Table 3.1 and utilized as part of the calibration are constructed by
summing together numerous individual series in the FR Y-9C. This construction of these series is
complicated by three factors:
1. Banks separately report securities as Held to Maturity (HTM), Available for Sale (AFS), or
Trading Assets (TA). The first two accounting categories are reported in Schedule HC-B (Se-
curites) and the last category is reported in Schedule HC-D (Trading Assets and Liabilities).
2. For HTM or AFS securities, banks report both the amortized cost (AC) and fair value (FV).
These values can be thought of as book and market values.
3. The reporting form changes over the years and hence the names of the variables in the FR
Y-9C dataset change as well.
Table C.1 reports the definitions for each security type in terms of the FR Y-9C variable names
and related information. The fair value for a bank’s entire holdings of a given security type is the
sum of the fair value of its holdings reported across all schedules.
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Security Type Description Schedule Value Period Formula Using FR Y-9C Variable Names
Asset-backed (Total) Includes the following reference
assets: Credit card receivables,
Home equity lines, Automobile
loans, Other consumer loans,
Commercial and industrial loans,
Other
HC-B AC Full
BHCKB838 + BHCKB840 + BHCKB842 + BHCKB844 + BHCKB846 +
BHCKB848 + BHCKB850 + BHCKB852 + BHCKB854 + BHCKB856 +
BHCKB858 + BHCKB860
HC-B FV Full
BHCKB839 + BHCKB841 + BHCKB843 + BHCKB845 + BHCKB847 +
BHCKB849 + BHCKB851 + BHCKB853 + BHCKB855 + BHCKB857 +
BHCKB859 + BHCKB861
HC-D FV Full
BHCKF643 + BHCKF644 + BHCKF645 + BHCKF646 + BHCKF647 +
BHCKF648
Equities Investments in mutual funds and
other equity securities with readily
determinable fair values
HC-B AC Full BHCKA510
HC-B FV Full BHCKA511
HC-D FV Full BHCKF652 + BHCKF653
Loans Total Loans and Lease Financing
Receivables on the balance sheet
(HC-C) and held as Trading Assets
(HC-D)
HC-C AC Full BHCK2122
HC-D FV Before 2011 BHCKF610 + BHCKF614 + BHCKF615 + BHCKF616 + BHCKF199 +BHCKF617 + BHCKF618
2011 - End
BHCKF610 + BHCKF614 + BHCKF615 + BHCKF616 + BHCKF199 +
BHCKF210 + BHCKF618
MBS (Govt-backed) Includes mortgage-backed
securities categorized as (1)
Pass-through securities issued or
guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or
GNMA and (2) Other
mortgage-backed securities issued
or guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC,
or GNMA (include CMOs,
REMICs, and stripped MBS)
HC-B AC Before 2009
BHCK1699 + BHCK1701 + BHCK1703 + BHCK1706 + BHCK1714 +
BHCK1716 + BHCK1718 + BHCK1731
2009 - 2011 BHCKG300 + BHCKG302 + BHCKG304 + BHCKG306 + BHCKG312 +BHCKG314 + BHCKG316 + BHCKG318 + BHCKG324 + BHCKG326
2011 - End
BHCKG300 + BHCKG302 + BHCKG304 + BHCKG306 + BHCKG312 +
BHCKG314 + BHCKG316 + BHCKG318 + BHCKK142 + BHCKK144 +
BHCKK150 + BHCKK152
HC-B FV Before 2009 BHCK1700 + BHCK1702 + BHCK1705 + BHCK1707 + BHCK1715 +BHCK1717 + BHCK1719 + BHCK1732
2009 - 2011 BHCKG301 + BHCKG303 + BHCKG305 + BHCKG307 + BHCKG313 +BHCKG315 + BHCKG317 + BHCKG319 + BHCKG325 + BHCKG327
2011 - End
BHCKG301 + BHCKG303 + BHCKG305 + BHCKG307 + BHCKG313 +
BHCKG315 + BHCKG317 + BHCKG319 + BHCKK143 + BHCKK145 +
BHCKK151 + BHCKK153
HC-D FV Before 2008 BHCK3534 + BHCK3535
2008 - 2009 BHCM3534 + BHCM3535
2010 - End BHCKG379 + BHCKG380 + BHCKK197
MBS (Private)
Includes mortgage-backed
securities categorized as (1) Other
pass-through securities and (2) All
other mortgage-backed securities
HC-B AC Before 2009 BHCK1709 + BHCK1711 + BHCK1733 + BHCK1735
2009 - 2011 BHCKG308 + BHCKG310 + BHCKG320 + BHCKG322 + BHCKG328 +BHCKG330
2011 - End BHCKG308 + BHCKG310 + BHCKG320 + BHCKG322 + BHCKK146 +BHCKK148 + BHCKK154 + BHCKK156
HC-B FV Before 2009 BHCK1710 + BHCK1713 + BHCK1734 + BHCK1736
2009 - 2011 BHCKG309 + BHCKG311 + BHCKG321 + BHCKG323 + BHCKG329 +BHCKG331
2011 - End BHCKG309 + BHCKG311 + BHCKG321 + BHCKG323 + BHCKK147 +BHCKK149 + BHCKK155 + BHCKK157
HC-D FV Before 2008 BHCK3536
2008 - 2009 BHCM3536
2010 BHCKG382
2011 - End BHCKG381 + BHCKK198
Other Debt Includes ”Other domestic debt
securities” and ”Foreign debt
securities”
HC-B AC Full BHCK1737 + BHCK1739 + BHCK1742 + BHCK1744
HC-B FV Full BHCK1738 + BHCK1741 + BHCK1743 + BHCK1746
HC-D FV Before 2008 BHCK3537
2008 - 2009 BHCM3537
2010 - End BHCKG383 + BHCKG384 + BHCKG385 + BHCKG386
U.S. Govt Agency U.S. government agency
obligations (exclude
mortgage-backed securities)
HC-B AC Full BHCK1289 + BHCK1291 + BHCK1294 + BHCK1297
HC-B FV Full BHCK1290 + BHCK1293 + BHCK1295 + BHCK1298
HC-D FV Before 2008 BHCK3532
2008 - End BHCM3532
U.S. State and Muni
Securities issued by states and
political subdivisions in the U.S.
HC-B AC Full BHCK8496 + BHCK8498
HC-B FV Full BHCK8497 + BHCK8499
HC-D FV Before 2008 BHCK3533
2008 - End BHCM3533
U.S. Treasury U.S. Treasury securities HC-B AC Full BHCK0211 + BHCK1286
HC-B FV Full BHCK0213 + BHCK1287
HC-D FV Before 2008 BHCK3531
2008 - End BHCM3531
Table C.1: Constructing Securities Holdings from FR Y-9C Data
Notes: All information in the table is from the FR Y-9C reporting form and instructions. “AC” is amortized cost, “FV” is fair value.
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C.4 Computing Share Sold and Unrealized Losses
The computations in this section can be applied to an individual bank’s holdings or the aggre-
gated holdings across many banks.
For a security type i, the transition equations for the fair value (FVi) and book value (ACi) of
a bank’s holdings are
FVi,t = (1− si,t)(1−Ψi,t)FVi,t−1 (C.1)
ACi,t = (1− si,t)ACi,t−1 (C.2)
where Ψi,t is percent decline in the market value of the holdings over the quarter and si,t is the share
of the holdings sold during the quarter. In the data, we only observe FV and AC as described in
Table C.1. We can back out the values for s and Ψ using the beginning and ending values for FV
and AC.
The expression for share sold (si,t) is
si,t =
ACi,t−1 − ACi,t
ACi,t−1
(C.3)
Using the above expression, the expression for percent value decline (Ψi,t) is
Ψi,t = 1− FVi,t
(1− si,t)FVi,t−1 (C.4)
Using both of these expressions, the unrealized loss over the quarter is
(
Ψi,t
1−Ψi,t
)
FVi,t (C.5)
This figure in dollars can be easily summed across banks or security types.
In Table C.1, we see that book value is only reported for the security type holdings in the
securities book (HC-B). Only fair value is reported for the security type holdings in the trading
book (HC-D). I estimate the share of the holdings in the trading book sold (stai,t) using the following
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expression
stai,t = 1−
FV tai,t
FV tat−1(1−Ψaggi,t )
(C.6)
where Ψaggi,t is the market price decline computed according to (C.4) using the aggregate banking
book holdings of the security type.
To compute the share sold across all holdings (securities and trading), I compute the weighted
average
saggi,t = s
sec
i,t
FV seci,t−1
FV tai,t−1 + FV
sec
i,t−1
+ stai,t
FV tai,t−1
FV tai,t−1 + FV
sec
i,t−1
(C.7)
To compute the share sold for a subtotal category k of trading assets (e.g., “Risky”), I take the
weighted average of all of the underlying J types
stak,t =
J∑
j=1
staj,t
FV taj,t−1∑J
j=1 FV
ta
j,t−1
(C.8)
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APPENDIX D
CALIBRATION DETAILS
I set B = 2 where bank 1 represents banks over $250 billion in assets as of the beginning of
2008Q4 and bank 2 represents all other banks. Specifically, bank 1 is comprised of the following
BHCs:
1. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO (1039502)
2. BANK ONE CORP (1068294)
3. WACHOVIA CORP (1073551)
4. BANK OF AMER CORP (1073757)
5. STATE STREET CORP (1111435)
6. WELLS FARGO & CO (1120754)
7. CITIGROUP (1951350)
The name for each institution is the last reported entity short name (RSSD9010) and the number
in parentheses is the RSSD identifier in the FR Y-9C dataset. Bank One was acquired by J.P.
Morgan Chase on July 1, 2004. I include this bank as part of Bank 1 despite not meeting the strict
definition because it was over $250 billion in assets when purchased. Wachovia was purchased by
Wells Fargo on December 31, 2008.
D.1 Parameters Directly Measured in the Data
Asset 2 Return Parameters (µ2 and σ2). The sample mean and volatility of the return on
intermediate-term government bonds over the period 2002-2006. Underlying monthly data are
from Ibbotson Associates. The monthly mean and volatility are converted to quarterly return units.
Intermediate-term return series (ITGOVBD) corresponds to government bonds with maturity of 5
years. Banks do not report maturity structure of specific security types on the FR Y-9C, but they
do report a rough maturity structure for their entire securities holdings. On average, portfolios
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include roughly 60-65% with maturity greater than 5 years, 20-30% with maturity between 1-5
years, and 10-20% with maturity less than 1 year. Thus a weighted average maturity of 5 years
seems reasonable.
Probability of Asset 1 Shock (q). The advanced economy average probability of a crisis based
on historical observations. Laeven and Valencia (2012) compile a database that includes all sys-
temic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970-2011. The advanced
economy average probability of crisis in their database is 4.0 percent.
Asset 1 Percent Decline Given Shock (ξ). The cumulative excess net charge-off rate for the
aggregate loan portfolio over the period 2008-2010. In Figure D.1, we see that the net charge-off
rate started to increase in 2008. The average annual rate between 2002-2006 is 0.77%. Subtract
this average rate from the values in 2008-2010 to compute excess rates and sum over the period
2008-2010 to find 4.98%. I use the cumulative excess net charge-off rate including 2009 and
2010 even though the crisis outcome in the calibration is for 2008Q4 because the market and bank
managers generally anticipated these future losses.
Figure D.1: Aggregate Net Charge-Off Rates
Net charge-offs are charge-offs (BHCK4635) less recoveries (BHCK4605). For data details see Appendix C.
74
Initial Equilibrium Asset 3 Price Decline (Ψ3). The percent decline in the FINRA-Bloomberg
Price Index for investment grade bonds between September 10, 2008 and October 10, 2008. The
index is constructed using all bonds in the following credit categories as defined by NASD Rule
6200 Series as “Investment Grade”: AAA, AA, A, BBB. See time series plot in Figure 3.1. The
coefficient for the linear price impact function in (3.2), ψ3, is determined such that the benchmark
calibration delivers an initial equilibrium price decline equal to this value.
Cost of debt (RD − 1). The average cost of funds across all banks over the period 2002-2006.
Cost of funds for a given quarter is computed as the sum of total interest expense on deposits
(BHCKA517 + BHCKA518 + BHCK6761 + BHCK4172) and total expense on federal funds pur-
chased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase (BHCK4180) divided by the average
balance of the sum of total deposits (BHDM6631 + BHDM6636 + BHFN6631 + BHFN6636)
and federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase (BHDMB993 +
BHCKB995).
Shares of Aggregate Equity Capital (Eb/(E1 + E2)). The relative share of aggregate tier 1
capital for each group of banks over the period 2002-2006. The sum of the shares must equal one.
The share for the largest banks (bank 1) is 0.503. See time series in Figure D.3
Minimum Capital Ratios (κbreg). The approximate average tier 1 capital ratio for the largest
banks over the period 2002-2006. Before 2013, all banks formally had the same minimum tier 1
capital ratio of 6% to be considered “well capitalized” (i.e., avoid PCA). In practice, however, all
banks held a consistent buffer over this minimum (Figure D.3). Given that the model only includes
a crisis with relatively low probability, it will not generate a similar consistent capital buffer. As a
comprimise, I set the minimum capital ratio as if it was equal to the average capital ratio held by the
largest banks, which is approximately 8%. This value has the additional benefit that it is the same
as the calibrated ζ value used in the systemic risk measure (Definition 2). Therefore the benchmark
calibration implies the smallest possible minimum capital ratios to avoid systemic risk during non-
crisis times, which is intuitively consistent with the belief that regulation was insufficient prior to
the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
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D.2 Parameters Chosen to Match Initial Portfolio Shares and Selling Decisions
There are several parameters that are either difficult or impossible to measure directly. The
values for these parameters are chosen to match two types of empirical observations: portfolio
shares and selling decisions. For portfolio shares, there are six data points (three shares for two
banks) corresponding to the average relative portfolio share over the period 2002-2006. See Table
D.2. For the selling decisions, the outcome must be that bank 1 is sells asset 3 in equilibrium and
bank 2 does not.
Assets as of Sept. 30, 2008
Over $250 billion Under $250 billion
Asset 1 0.631 0.740
Asset 2 0.154 0.191
Asset 3 0.191 0.069
Table D.1: Portfolio Shares in the Data
Portfolio shares are average values over the period 2002-2006. Portfolio shares are also fractions relative to the sum of
assets 1-3, not balance sheet assets. Asset 1 corresponds to all “Loans” as defined in Table C.1. Asset 2 corresponds
to the sum of the fair value of the safe securities as shown in Table 3.1. Asset 3 corresponds to the sum of the fair
value of the securities with fire sale risk as shown in Table 3.1. The definitions for these security types in the data can
be found in Table C.1. For data details see Appendix C.
Despite seeming to have seven parameters (µ1, σ1, µ3, σ3, γ, α1, α2, φ) and exactly seven target
values, it is not possible to exactly match the portfolio shares. The issue is that heterogeneity in αb
is not flexible enough to generate the significantly different portfolio shares observed. Therefore I
choose the set of parameters that minimizes the following objective function
2∑
b=1
3∑
i=1
(
A∗b0,i
1′A∗b0
− f bi
)2
(D.1)
where A∗b0 denote optimal bank portfolio holdings and f
b
i represents the empirical data averages
shown in Table D.2. In Table 3.3 in the main text, I present the empirical portfolio shares alongside
the shares implied by the model.
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D.3 Increasing Capital Requirements and Equity Capital
Assuming β∗ = 0 and suppressing the b superscripts, the capital requirement constraint is
E0
w′A0
= κreg
In this form, the bank can only satisfy a higher value for κreg by either increasing E0 or decreasing
w′ (A0) or some combination of the two. I formally represent this choice with a parameter g ∈ [0, 1]
that is an input to the following equation that determines a bank’s updated equity capital
ENew0 = E
Initial
0 ×
(
1 + g ×
(
κNewreg
κInitialreg
− 1
))
(D.2)
If g = 0, the bank achieves a higher minimum capital requirement entirely through shrinking its
risk-weighted assets. If g = 1, the bank does so entirely through increasing its initial equity capital.
For guidance, we can use the observed increase in bank capital ratios since the financial crisis.
Following the financial crisis, regulators put pressure on banks to increase their capital ratios. In
2013 and 2015, regulators finalized rules that formalized increases in minimum capital require-
ments.1 In the left panel of Figure D.3, we can see that banks have indeed increased their tier 1
capital ratios to comply with the new minimums. In the right panel, I decompose these observed
changes into the underlying changes from risk-weighted assets and equity capital levels. The fact
that all of the red bars are negative means that all banks increased risk-weighted assets over the
period from 2006 to 2016. The positive green bars reiterate this finding by displaying the large and
positive growth in equity capital over the same period. In conclusion, it appears that banks met the
higher capital requirements entirely through increasing equity capital (g = 1).
For an alternative perspective, I show the shares of equity capital and assets for each BHC size
group over the same time period. In Figure D.3, we see that the relative size of the largest group
has increased slightly in terms of equity capital from 2006 to 2016. However, the relative size of
1See Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 198 (Friday, October 11, 2013) and Federal Register, Vol. 80, No. 157, (Friday,
August 14, 2015).
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(a) Tier 1 Capital Ratios (b) Decomposition of Change, 2006Q4 to 2016Q4
Figure D.2: Tier 1 Capital Ratios by BHC Size Group
The values for the bars in the right panel are found by using the following decomposition formula for the ending
capital ratio (2016Q4) as a function of the initial capital ratio (2006Q4) and the growth rates of the components:
Eend
RWAend
= EendEstart × RWAstartRWAend × EstartRWAstart . For data details see Appendix C.
assets for the same group has remained very similar over the same period. Given that this group
also increased its capital ratio by the largest amount, it supports the conclusion that banks met
higher capital requirements entirely through equity capital.
(a) Tier 1 Equity Capital (b) Tangible Assets
Figure D.3: Relative Size of Equity Capital And Assets by BHC Size Group
For data details see Appendix C.
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